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ABSTRACT 
 
RATIONALITY, MODERNISM AND TURKISH CONSERVATIVE 
ENGINEERS 	  
Şanlı, Hatice Esra 
MA, Department of Cultural Studies 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. İrvin Cemil Schick 
September 2014, 101 pages	  	  
This study aims to provide a background for interpretation of rational thinking 
and modernization in late Ottoman and Turkish Republic eras. In order to do this, 
the idea of rationality and rise of conservatism is reviewed by following the ideas 
of Weber, Habermas and Marcuse on rationality, bureaucratization and 
technology in the West. As a reactionary movement, main pillars of conservatism 
is discussed and the reflections of these ideas in late 19th, early 20th century in 
Ottoman Empire is given by examining the ideas of Egyptian modernist 
Muhammad Abduh and Mehmet Akif and in Turkish Republic era it is examined 
through the state ideology and conservative engineers as political figures. In this 
study, engineers are considered as one of the major representatives of 
modernization process as a profession and under the light of in-depth interviews 
made with conservative engineers, rational thinking and positioning of 
conservatism in Turkey is discussed. 
Keywords: Rationalism, Enlightenment, Modernity, Conservatism, Islam, 
Engineering 
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ÖZ 
RASYONALİTE, MODERNLİK VE MUHAFAZAKAR MÜHENDİSLER 
Şanlı, Hatice Esra 
MA, Kültürel Çalışmalar Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. İrvin Cemil Schick 
Eylül 2014, 101 sayfa 
 	  
Bu çalışma Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet dönemlerinde rasyonel düşünce ve 
modernizasyon çalışmaları üzerine bir arka plan sağlamak ve muhafazakar 
mühendislerin bakış açısıyla modernlik ve muhafazakarlık kavramlarına 
projeksiyon tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Rasyonalite, Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas 
ve Herbert Marcuse’nin Batı’da rasyonalite, bürokratikleşme ve teknoloji üzerine 
çalışmalarından yararlanarak incelenmiştir. Muhafazakarlığın yapıtaşları ve 19. 
yüzyıl sonu 20. yüzyıl başı Osmanlı coğrafyasındaki yansımaları Mehmet Akif ve 
Muhammed Abduh’un yazıları üzerinden incelenmiştir. Cumhuriyet döneminde 
ise, devlet ideolojisi ve muhafazakar olarak nitelenen mühendisler üzerinden bir 
inceleme yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmada mühendisler, modernizasyon sürecinin ana 
temsilcilerinden kabul edilerek, muhafazakar mühendislerle yapılan mülakatlar 
ışığında, onların bakış açısından Türkiye’de rasyonel düşünce ve 
muhafazakarlığın yeri tartışılmıştır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Rasyonalite, Modernlik, Muhafazakarlık, Mühendisler 
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Introduction 
 
1. Historical Background 
	  
In an age known for technological improvements, rational thinking, and a 
dominant capitalist economic system, engineering is one of the professions 
standing at the very center of these concepts since engineers are the 
representatives of technology in society, key players in industries that sustain the 
capitalist economic system, and practitioners of the rational-scientific approach 
known to be one of the pillars of modern thinking.  
Max Weber stated that all these developments started with the idea of rationalism. 
His writings focused on the “disenchantment of the world,” the bureaucracy, and 
the lack of freedom appeared in the West. Weber used the term “rationalism” in 
reference to the modernization process of western civilization, and focused on the 
question: “Why was western civilization the only one that developed a certain 
kind of cultural phenomenon and had universal significance?” According to him, 
rationalism arose in various realms of life and varies from culture to culture. 
However, only the western type of rationalism has universal validity. 
Other than rationalism in the social and economic realms, in Muslim societies, 
rationalism in the realm of religion was considered a problematic issue in the late 
nineteenth century. A prominent scholar that discussed the notion of modernity in 
Muslim societies was the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh. In Ottoman lands, 
Mehmed Akif (Ersoy) actively defended reforms in Muslim societies in the 
speeches he delivered at mosques and in his writings published in periodicals. In 
these thinkers’ writings, discussions revolved around such topics as the 
	  	   2 
adaptability of the Muslim lifestyle to western norms, and the elimination of 
superstitions and baseless traditions from social practices. The major theme in 
discussions of these issues was the creation of coherence between Islam and 
western modernity.  
In contrast to the approach adopted by Ottoman thinkers who sought harmony 
between modernity and Islam, the founders of the Republic of Turkey embraced 
western modernity as the goal of the state without consideration of its 
compatibility with Muslim society. On the 10th anniversary of Turkish Republic 
speech in Ankara, on 29 October 1933, the Republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk formulated this goal as “reaching the level of contemporary civilization.” 
This shows that the creation of a new Turkish culture based on the norms of the 
West had become more important for the leadership of the times than carrying 
over the Ottoman religious and cultural inheritance to the contemporary world.  
A new culture based on applying western notions of modernity to various spheres 
of life — from the public sphere such as the law, science, and the economy, to the 
private such as marriage and social relations — was constructed by the state, 
under the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) that was founded as 
the first and only party of Turkey during the early republican period known as the 
monoparty era. Since the formation of this new culture was artificially realized by 
the state, society’s participation in and acceptance of it remained limited. The 
inhabitants of the rural parts of Anatolia, which constituted some 80% of the 
population of Turkey in the early to mid-twentieth century, could not identify 
with the people in the government and with the RPP’s policies.  
Following the opening to multiparty politics in 1945, new political parties 
emerged in Turkey, and for the first time, a party other than the RPP won the 
opportunity to form a government in 1950. This new party, named the Democrat 
Party (DP), had gained the majority of the people’s support by taking a stance 
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against the RPP’s elitist and bureaucratic rule. The DP’s criticism of the RPP’s 
cultural policies oriented toward westernization resonated with villagers and 
small town dwellers, who had felt forced to give up their Islamic culture and 
adopt a foreign, western lifestyle.  
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, a founder of the DP, became a symbol of both 
economic development and the defense of traditional values. Although the DP 
was eventually overthrown in a military coup and Menderes was put to death, 
other conservative (muhafazakâr) figures emerged on the Turkish political stage 
in the years that followed, notably Süleyman Demirel, Turgut Özal, and 
Necmettin Erbakan. All three had been trained as engineers before entering 
politics, a fact that was as well known to the public as their conservative 
ideology. The politically moderate environment they created allowed people to 
adopt an Islamic lifestyle, while the economic opportunities they created for 
lower-middle class people opened avenues for their upward mobility. 
Even though these conservative engineer-politicians positioned themselves 
against the policies of the RPP, which fashioned itself the protector of Atatürk’s 
reforms, their own politics did not directly confront the philosophy of the 
Republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. On the contrary, statements were 
given to respect modern Turkish government developed within the guidance of 
Kemal Atatürk. A populist discourse was produced, encompassing the religious 
and cultural values of society while protecting the main pillars of the democratic 
state. Atatürk’s vision of “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations” was 
preserved, while at the same time the values inherited from Turkey’s Islamic-
Ottoman cultural background were cherished and protected.  
As part of Turkey’s development plans, engineering was promoted in order to 
develop the country’s industrial base. As a result of the increase thus achieved in 
the number of engineers, coupled with heavy investment in industry and 
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technology, engineers gained authority and became actively involved in Turkey’s 
modernization process and politics. Although the relationship between 
modernization and engineering is not obvious at first sight, technocratic ideology 
claim that engineering can also be done for social affairs and rationalism 
engineers applied in industry can also be applied to society which is called “social 
engineering”.  
Industrial development is an issue of great urgency for non-western societies, as it 
is seen as the path to reaching a western standard of living. As the leaders of 
industrial development, engineers have more important socio-political role in 
such countries than they do in the West. Beyond commanding authority in 
industry, engineers are expected to encourage industrialization and rational 
thinking against traditionalism, and this gives them a distinguished position in 
society.  
In contemporary Turkey, engineers’ ideas on professionalism and their 
perspective on social affairs are likely to shed light on both industrial 
development and the development of civil society in the country. Moreover, since 
the number of religious-conservative engineers increased significantly as a result 
of the policies of the Nationalist Front governments in the late 1970s, and 
especially during the prime ministership of Turgut Özal during the late 1980s, it 
is of special interest to investigate the attitudes of these engineers with regard to 
rationalism, professionalism, religion, and modernity, particularly insofar as they 
may shed light upon the future of Islamism in Turkey. 
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2. This Study 
 
During the late Ottoman period, modernization was taken up as the primary 
means to save the empire against foreign encroachments and socio-economic 
decline. The modernization project began with the foundation of schools of 
engineering and, relatedly, the development of advanced military technology. In 
the years that followed, the western notion of modernity was discussed among 
Muslim intellectuals in terms of the Islamic faith and religious laws. The present 
study discusses the views of the Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh, his 
teacher Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and the Ottoman poet and thinker Mehmed Akif 
in an effort to highlight he debates revolving around the relationship between 
Islam and modernity during the late nineteenth century.  
Engineers were active participants in the Ottoman drive for modernization, and 
today, they continue to play important social, economic, and political roles in 
republican Turkey. For this reason, the question posed at the beginning of this 
study was: “What do conservative engineers think about the modernization of 
Turkey?” Although the study has a historical dimension in that it seeks the roots 
of the discourse of modernization in Ottoman-Turkish lands, it also focuses on 
the sociological dimension of conservatism and religion in Turkey from the 
perspective of engineers.  
I chose to conduct my research among engineers, rather than economists, 
corporate managers, or marketeers, because I was interested in their unique 
perspective on modernity and modernization. Although politicians have more 
powerful roles in society and experts in finance are the key players in money 
markets and the capitalist economy, the fact that engineers — with their technical 
education and their role as carriers of rational scientific norms into society’s 
everyday life — are bridges between rational methodologies and practical life led 
	  	   6 
me to write this thesis on their views. I interviewed not engineers in general, but 
rather those engineers who define themselves as conservative and have a religious 
lifestyle. It is important to note that rational thinking exists not only in western 
culture but in others as well. However, in this study, the terms rationality and 
rational thinking are used to refer to the western notion of rationalism, as this 
notion is also part of the “westernization” project of the Turkish state.  
The aim of this study is to shed light upon the relationship between Turkey’s 
westernizing state policies and the engineers holding conservative views in 
Turkey. Naturally, the important question here is whether or not having religious 
views presents a challenge for embracing modernity. In order to answer this 
question, it is necessary to clarify the characteristics of religious-conservative 
thought. In addition to Islamic education, it is clear that social experiences and 
technical education have contributed to shaping the views of the engineers. This 
shaping process creates a new form coherent with modernity and Islamic beliefs; 
we can define this as a vernacular form that reflects the cultural and political 
specificity of Turkey.  
This study is based on in-depth interviews with conservative engineers on the 
subjects of rationalism, the conservative worldview, Turkey’s modernization 
project, and professionalism in Turkey. The informants were selected from 
different fields and various positions in those fields. They came from different 
cultural and economic backgrounds and were not limited to a specific age range. 
 
 
	  	   7 
 
CHAPTER I	  
	  
Rationalism and Bureaucracy	  
 
 
I know whence I originate! 
Like a flame insatiate 
I anneal me and consume. 
Light grows all that I conceive, 
Embers everything I leave: 
Certainty is I am flame! 
Nietzche1 
 
1.1 Rationalism from the perspective of Weber 
 
There are images of Weber with different characteristics. The first image is of a 
liberal man who believes in personal salvation. He has a pessimistic character and 
his way of thinking resembles that of Nietzsche, finding its meaning in the motto 
“all the values devalue themselves”. Weber’s ideas on the nature of power and 
rationalization in the modern context depict the domination of man over nature, 
and this domination requires bureaucratization in order to exclude irrational and 
incalculable feelings from man’s tasks. Weber’s pessimism appears at this point, 
for he believed that rationalized efficiency dehumanizes its creators and leads to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The poem “Ecce Homo” from “Joke, Cunning and Revenge: Prelude in German Rhyme”, Translated by 
Mark Daniel Cohen, Hyperion vol. 2, issue 4, December 2007. 
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alienation. Contrary to Marx, Weber did not believe in the temporariness of 
alienation. Instead, he used the iron cage metaphor to draw a sketch of the future: 
there is a cage made of iron that enslaves people, and iron is used as a symbol of 
industrialization, representing industrialized Europe. 2  Çiğdem interprets this 
thought as “modern destiny is spiritual in the beginning, mechanical in the end” 
(Çiğdem, 2010, p. 164). 
On the other hand there is also another image of Weber that is distinguished by 
his nationalist character and his efforts to position Germany as a world power. 
Our focus will be on Weber’s first image and specifically on his studies on the 
loss of meaning, rationalism, and Islam. 
Modernity and modernization developed from the emergence of rationalization in 
Western culture. Weber read this rationalization process in two interconnected 
phases: The rise and spread of instrumental rationalism, and disenchantment with 
religion and myth. Weber basically constituted his thesis on disenchantment with 
religion and traced it back to early religious practices (magical religiosity). He 
took the transformation from tribal magical religiosity to monotheistic religion as 
the first developmental transition, and disenchantment with these monotheistic 
religions as the second developmental transition stage.  
In this section, the outcome of the rationalization process will be examined on a 
social level through the works of Max Weber on the analysis of rationalism and 
bureaucracy. Weber started with early historical religious performances and 
stated that the rules of these performances are learned through day-to-day 
experience, not through a rational course. Power rests in a “spirit” or “essence.” 
This spirit is described as “neither soul, demon, nor god, but something 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Ahmet Çiğdem explained the source of the iron cage metaphor. He referred to Bunyan’s “The Pilgrim’s 
Progress.” There is a man who has been tempted away by pleasure and had sinned and was hopelessly 
sitting in the iron cage. Weber associated this man’s position with the modern Christian’s position. The 
iron cage keeps the person disabled and hopeless. For this reason it also refers to the loss of meaning and 
freedom. (Çiğdem, 2010, p.164) 
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indeterminate, material yet visible, non-personal and yet somehow endowed with 
will” (Weber, 1993, p. 3). These beliefs evolved in time and turned into symbols, 
acts of worship performed through representation and analogy. In time, the 
rationalization of religion was performed by the functional specialization of gods. 
Weber emphasized the economic aspect of this process:  
The outstanding economic importance of certain events may enable 
a particular god to achieve primacy within the pantheon, as for 
example, the primacy of the god of Heaven. He may be conceived of 
primarily as the master of light and warmth, but among groups that 
raise cattle, he is most frequently conceived of as the lord of 
reproduction (Weber, 1993, p. 13). 
One of the most significant theories Weber posited about the recent history of 
religion is the connection between Protestantism and the rise of Occidental 
rationalism. Weber established a connection between the Protestant “calling” and 
the emergence of rational labor. This “calling” is explained as follows: “The only 
way of living acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic 
asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the 
individual by his position in the world. This was his calling” (Weber, 1992, p. 40). 
Material prosperity is not only taken as a function of satisfying the material needs 
of life, but is also related to the expression of diligence in one’s calling (Weber, 
2002, p. 12). 
The doctrine of Calvinism, which assumed predestination, led to an 
unprecedented inner loneliness for individuals. The most important thing in 
individuals’ lives is their eternal salvation, for which they are forced to walk 
alone in this path to meet a destiny decreed for them by God. Their salvation is 
not through the church but is between God and the individual’s heart. Weber 
suggested: 
The great historic process in the development of religions, the 
elimination of magic from the world which had begun with the old 
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Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific 
thought, had repudiated all magical means to salvation as 
superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion (Weber, 
1992, p. 61). 
The rationalization of religion originated from an orientation toward inner sacred 
values like the means of salvation and “sublimation from ritualism and towards 
religious absolutism” (Weber, 2009, p. 328). Man’s relations with internal and 
external values as well as religious and secular values were rationalized and 
sublimated. This position created a consciousness of the “internal and lawful 
autonomy” of the individual spheres. Weber said that this results from the 
rationalization and sublimation of knowledge of inner and otherworldly values 
(Mills, 1946). In his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber’s 
thesis was basically that modern material and secular culture is indebted to the 
Protestant reformation of the sixteenth century. Weber believed that the most 
significant success of the Reformation was Luther’s usage of the word “Beruf” 
(occupation) in his translation of the Bible. Contrary to traditional societies’ 
understanding of labor – they believed that working was for inferior people in 
society and scorned working for worldly affairs – the concept of Beruf legitimizes 
working and work ethics for societies. Luther was the first person in the West to 
use “Beruf” (occupation) for material affairs in a translation of the Bible (Sunar, 
2012, pp. 174-175). 
However, it should be noted that the understanding of “progress” in the modern 
world and the Protestant “calling” in the sixteenth century do not have the same 
source of motivation. Rational thinking on the foundation of the idea of a “calling” 
is assumed to be part of the capitalist spirit born out of Christian asceticism. 
However, while modern homo economicus seemed to be rooted in this Puritan 
reference, today it has already disappeared (Ascher, 2010, p. 1). Weber stated:  
The old Protestantism of such men as Luther, Calvin, Knox, or Voet 
had little to do with what is today called “progress”. It was directly 
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hostile to whole aspects of modern life which today even the most 
extreme sectarian would not wish to do away with. So if an inner 
affinity between the old Protestant Spirit and modern capitalist 
culture is to be found, we must try, for good or ill, to seek it not in its 
more or less materialistic or at least anti-ascetic enjoyment of life, 
but rather in its purely religious features (2002, p. 7). 
In his writings about his observations in the United States, Weber stated that 
religious affiliation had an important position in social and business life, which 
depended on credit relations. At that point, the crucial formations were sects 
(denominations). Sect membership represented the moral qualification and 
business morals of the individual. A sect would only accept a member whose 
conduct made him appear morally qualified, since the sect would be taken as a 
reference to creditors and would not allow the creditors to suffer losses on 
account of a sect member. The congregation had the role of providing a 
confidence in society. This confidence had strategic importance, especially in 
business relations. In his notes, Weber pointed out that, in general, only those 
men who belonged to the Methodist and Baptist churches were successful in 
business, and, moreover, that if a sect member moved to another place or if he 
was a travelling salesman, he would carry his ‘certificate of congregation’ with 
him. Thus, belonging to a sect was a certification of morality. Even though the 
congregations and the sects were based on religion, they were not associated 
purely with the religious beliefs and actions of the individuals. They had the 
function of controlling the economy, establishing business networks, and creating 
a society in which people were distinguished. Religious organizations had the role 
of providing leverage, especially for the middle class. As mentioned above, they 
established a business network and were the vehicle for becoming an 
entrepreneur.  
Religion had the role of faith and belief, which was taken as a guarantee or 
certificate of confidence and moral values. As Weber pointed out, people 
believed that a person who had faith in God and who controlled his actions with 
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the belief that a higher power was watching him would not cheat other people, as 
opposed to those who did not believe in a higher power and might not obey social 
contracts (Gerth and Mills, 1948, pp. 303-308). I believe that this is an important 
nuance and should be taken into consideration in analyzing the process of 
bureaucratization.  
Bureaucratization is the practice of regulating moves while processing or 
performing an action. It reduces the gaps in which people can use their 
subjectivity, and all actions have to be recorded; thus a person who is in 
bureaucracy may not necessarily be a moral person, but her/his movements are 
restricted by regulations. This situation eliminated the need for religion as a 
guarantee of morality in business relations. However, it should be noted that the 
sects described by Weber did not only provide economic benefits. They also 
provided spiritual benefits; thus a complete rational transformation of society 
cannot be said to have occurred at that stage of history. 
Since we have been examining the social effects of religious sects, we should 
note that Weber was not oriented toward the core of religion in his studies, but 
rather toward the experiences of the believers and their thoughts and missions, all 
in order to reach a definition through analyzing the given meanings of religious 
acts. He considered religious acts in terms of their worldly meanings and 
interpretations (Çiğdem, 2010, pp. 137-138). 
Weber pointed to the start of the secularization process as a change in the 
procedure for admitting members to denominations. Specifically, members began 
to be admitted by “ballot,” independently of their religious beliefs, following an 
examination of their virtues and morality. So far, we have focused on Christian 
religious traditions and emphasized the role of Puritanism and its transformation 
into a methodical, rational way of life within which modern capitalism arose. 
Weber also pointed out that this is the formation of the ethos of the modern 
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bourgeoisie. This is the basis of Weber’s rationalism theory. The disenchantment 
of the world is a stage in the rationalization process, and it opens the gates of 
modern capitalist virtues. Thus, Weber referred to a certain kind of rationalism, 
one that valued the Protestant ethic in the rise of different dimensions of 
rationalism. The reflections of this thought can be seen in the preface of his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. There, Weber claimed that 
modernity is only possible in the West because of the vitality of those dimensions 
of rationalism mentioned above. 
It is my belief that Weber’s essentialist claims about the Muslim community and 
its incapability to form a rational and capitalist system conflict with his research 
methodology. Weber used singular causal analysis in his studies. As a method, 
singular causal analysis leads the researcher to focus on selected potential causes 
and to compare additional conditions that may or may not cause the result in 
question. When it comes to the problem of evaluating a very large, potentially 
infinite number of possibilities, Fritz Ringer gave an illuminating explanation of 
Weber’s use of this method:  
According to Weber, we cannot assess the causal significance of an 
allegedly crucial political decision — or of any other possible cause 
— without trying to imagine what would have ensued in its absence. 
After all, a potentially infinite number of causal ‘moments’ or 
antecedent conditions have to be present to produce any concrete 
outcome. To identify significant singular causal relationships at all, 
therefore, we must inquire into the degree to which a particular 
cause ‘favored’ a given effect. But this in turn requires us 
hypothetically to ‘compare’ the result that actually followed with 
alternate possibilities. Thus historians need not apologize for their 
recourse to the “seemingly anti-deterministic category” of the 
merely possible, more or less probable. They cannot avoid reasoning, 
counterfactually, about historical events that did not occur, in order 
to identify the significant causes of what did occur (1997, p. 70). 
The paragraph above draws the portrait of a man who had freed 
himself of an essentialist perception. However, I would argue that 
Weber’s writings on Islam conflict with his methodology. In his 
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Weber and Islam, Bryan Turner stated that Weber’s studies 
centering on his understanding of Eastern and Western societies are 
highly contrasted. The West represents a rational and systematical 
character while the East represents “arbitrary and unstable” 
economic and political conditions in low industrialized civilizations.  
Lutfi Sunar has made an comprehensive	  comparison between the East and the 
West in Weber’s studies. The differences between the worldviews 
(Weltanschauung) of the East and the West created a contrast and dichotomy in 
their respective social structures. The common view reflected by Orientalist 
studies draws a portrait of “passive Eastern” and “active Western” cultures. In the 
East, religion isolates individuals from the world, while in the West religion 
directs individuals to the world (rationalism). Thus the East is mystic while the 
West is devotee (Sunar, 2012, p. 173). 
Talal Asad’s understanding of the secular can shed light upon the terms ‘mystical’ 
and ‘devotee.’ Pietism and the Enlightenment affected Christianity by attempting 
to eliminate the autocracy of the clergy and the dogmas of Christianity. 
Secularism is the way in which people create a moral system based upon 
individual conscience and rights. Contrary to a belief in the sacrifice of Jesus for 
the sake of humanity, if the world needs to be rescued, then a person must rescue 
himself in the first place. According to Asad, the history of Christian missions 
converted a spiritual promise (Jesus sacrificed himself for us) into a political 
project (change the world for Jesus), a modern way of salvation (2003, pp. 85-86). 
This explanation can be taken as the formation of devotees in the Christian world. 
According to Weber, the Islamic world lacked continuity and failed to form a 
rational worldview.  
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1.2 Science and Modernity 
 
In the previous section, we reviewed Weber’s views on rationalism. The common 
idea is that rationalism reformed people’s way of thinking and formed a system of 
thought based on scientific perception. Starting with the Age of Enlightenment, 
rational thinking began to dominate the social spheres and common sense. These 
reformations also affected the social spheres in terms of the urbanization of 
people’s lifestyles and technical improvements in communication and 
transportation, thus opening up the gates of industrialization. It must be 
underlined that there is a strong correlation between the rationalization of the 
Western world and industrialization. In this section, we shall review science and 
technology in relation to industrialization and modernization. The first issue to be 
discussed is the basic features of a modern, industrialized society. 
 
1.2.1 The Features of Modern Society  	  
At the beginning of his article “Modernization and Industrialization,” Krishan 
Kumar notes that “Modern society is industrial society. To modernize a society is, 
first of all, to industrialize it” (1990, p. 255). Essentially, modernization is a 
process of individualization, specialization, and abstraction. Habermas has 
described some of the historico-philosophical narratives of individualization. One 
such narrative is Kantian, another, Hegelian. The Kantian model describes the 
modernist situation and can be useful to describe individualization (Holub, 2001, 
p. 275). First, according to Habermas’ view, the project of modernity is the 
continuation of the Enlightenment. According to this Kantian model, cultural 
modernity was described by the separation of three types of activity: “science, 
morality, and art”. As mentioned in the first section, since the eighteenth century, 
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religious worldviews and the conception of metaphysics had begun to disintegrate 
and society has become disenchanted. These problems of religion and 
metaphysics were rearranged to fall under the aspects of “beauty, truth, 
authenticity, and normative rightness.” Then these questions were specified as 
questions “of knowledge, of justice and morality, and of taste”. The spheres of 
science, morality, and art began to form as domains of expertise, and criticism, 
jurisprudence, and scientific discourse were institutionalized within these 
domains. The problems of these domains are discussed through the views of 
experts (Habermas, 1981, p. 8). 
Habermas pointed out the negative effect of this situation. As discussed earlier, 
modern societies developed a systematic and consistent approach – we can say 
professionalism – in various spheres of science, morality, and art. In Weber’s 
terms, the formation of these areas of expertise was named rationalization. If we 
approach the theory of rationalization from Habermas’ perspective, this latter 
applied his research interest in rationalism to the theory of communicative action. 
The theory is based on three dimensions and the “relativity of rationalism based 
on hermeneutics” is its first dimension. 
Regarding this first dimension, we know that he saw a close relation between 
rationalism and knowledge. Rationality does not mean the possession of 
knowledge; rather, it is a way of acquiring and using knowledge. Following his 
assertion about the existence of a close relationship between rationality and 
knowledge, Habermas clarified his argument. How can an expression be counted 
as rational since knowledge can be unreliable and open to discussion? (Habermas, 
1983, pp. 8-9). Habermas answered this question himself: 
An expression satisfies the precondition for rationality if and insofar 
as it embodies fallible knowledge and therewith has a relation to the 
objective world (that is, a relation to the facts) and is open to 
objective judgment. A judgment can be objective if it is undertaken 
on the basis of a transsubjective validity claim that has the same 
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meaning for observers and nonparticipants as it has for the acting 
subject himself. Truth and efficiency are claims of this kind (1983, 
p. 9). 
As a hermeneutic approach, communication in a society has importance because 
of the platform it creates for communication between individuals. To be rational 
is to have a valid claim and to compete with other claims from the same variation. 
Validity has the precondition of a comprehensible statement, making the self 
understandable by other individuals or in communication with other individuals 
(Çiğdem, 2010, pp. 204-205). Habermas’ theory of rationalism is basically 
elucidated with the theory of argumentation in that sense. He stated that 
“Openness of rational expressions to criticism can create a ground for 
argumentation and argumentation is a learning process by which we can acquire 
theoretical knowledge, extend and renew our evaluative language and overcome 
our self-deceptions” (Habermas, 1983, p. 22). 
Going back to the point where we discussed the spheres and the specialized 
culture developed by experts in these spheres, Habermas saw a problematic issue 
here. He noted that the experts belonging to the spheres of science, morality, and 
art were more consistent than normal people on “cognitive-instrumental, moral-
practical, and aesthetic-expressive” rationalities. Thus, the distance between the 
experts and society had grown, and, as a result, the culture cultivated and accrued 
by the experts could not totally diffuse into society and be part of everyday 
praxis. This kind of cultural rationalization became impoverished since traditional 
values had already lost their significance.  
Habermas’ approach to technology showed the same characteristics by which he 
divided life into spheres and represented technology as suitable for some spheres 
and unsuitable for others. His approach defined the proper sphere for technology 
as neutral, while outside of its proper sphere technology causes “social 
pathologies” known as the major problems of modern societies (Feenberg, 1996, 
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pp. 46-47). For Habermas, technology remains unchained, not interacting with 
society, and originally related to success and control directly (Feenberg, 1999, p. 
157). 
In the end, the point I want to emphasize is the goal of the Enlightenment. 
Enlightenment thinkers aimed at releasing science, morality, and art from their 
esoteric bonds, developing an objective methodology, and using the cognition 
developed by these domains to enrich society for the rational organization of 
everyday life. Thus, the intention of Enlightenment thinkers was not only to 
develop an objective science and control nature, but also to use it for enhancing 
communication in society, understanding the world and the self, developing 
universal morality and justice, and, beyond that, increasing happiness in the world 
(Habermas, 1981, p. 9). 
Did the project of modernity achieve its aims? Was science released from its 
esoteric bonds and ideologies to develop free cognition? At this point we will 
continue with the ideas of Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas on science and 
ideology. 
 
1.2.2 Marcuse’s “One Dimensional Man” 	  
The concept of “rationalism” was introduced as the extension of rational thought 
in society, bureaucratic formations in law and administration, and capitalist 
economic activity. It also referred to industrialization, which changed not only 
work discipline and instrumental action in the workplace but also entire social 
areas through urbanization through technologies of transportation and 
communication. On the other hand, rationalism also referred to the 
disenchantment of the world, the idea of freeing the mind from unexplained 
values and beliefs, and the elimination of magic from everyday life in order to 
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achieve technical and scientific progress and improve the material world. In his 
study “Technology and Science as Ideology”, Habermas said that Marcuse took 
Weber’s understanding of rationalism – modern administration, industrial 
laborers, capitalist entrepreneurialism – as his point of departure and reinterpreted 
the implications of this term. Marcuse claimed that what is defined as rationalism 
is, as Weber referred to it, a “specific form of unacknowledged political 
domination” (Habermas, 1989, pp. 81-82). 
Marcuse established a connection between slavery in earlier times and the 
industrial man of the present. He thought that domination now creates a higher 
rationality in which the efficient use of natural and mental resources leads to 
larger scale distribution of the benefits of this efficient usage. As a result, the 
man’s enslavement grown by productive apparatus and this struggle reached an 
international level. Marcuse pointed to advanced industrial society as being 
responsible for the incorrect organization of society. For him the ideology of this 
society is the struggle for existence.  
We live and die rationally and productively. We know that 
destruction is the price of progress as death is the price of life, that 
renunciation and toil are the prerequisites for gratification and joy 
that business must go on and that the alternatives are Utopian. This 
ideology belongs to the established societal apparatus; it is a 
requisite for its continuous functioning and part of its rationality. 
However, the apparatus defeats its own purpose if its purpose is to 
create a humane existence on the basis of a humanized nature. And 
if this is not its purpose, its rationality is even more suspect. But it is 
also more logical for, from the beginning, the negative is in the 
positive, the inhuman in the humanization, enslavement in 
liberation. This dynamic is that of reality and not of the mind, but of 
a reality in which the scientific mind had a decisive part in joining 
theoretical and practical reason (1964, p. 98). 
Society adapted itself to the outcomes of technical rationality and manipulation. 
Technical knowledge and management reformed cultural and political areas as 
well as economic areas. A total submission to reason and technical knowledge 
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requires domination over the senses as well as practical/daily life experience. 
Marcuse said that “the ‘nature of things’ including that of society, was so defined 
as to justify repression even suppression as perfectly rational” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 
99). The outcome of this rational reformation of cultural, political and economic 
areas is increasing productivity. All in all, a higher standard of living is created.  
What could be the effects of this scientific rationalization on people’s lives, and 
how did pure science turn into an instrument with practical concerns? The 
rational perception including the quantification of nature separated the true from 
the good, and science from ethics. What the concept of nature is only valid – 
scientifically rational – in terms of general laws of motion – physical, chemical, 
and biological. Under these circumstances, values are considered subjective and 
exiled from the rational world. Marcuse said that the only way to rescue these 
values is a metaphysical sanction, but such a sanction is not verifiable either. In 
the end, values may have higher dignity, but they are not taken as objective and 
so they are accorded less credit in business life.  
Business life is dominated by scientific rationality in terms of being objective or 
“professional”. Values and beliefs are considered non-objective even if they are 
highly recognized in society. The only way to increase their significance is to 
recognize them as “ideals.” For this solution, Marcuse said that by taking values 
as ideals, “they don’t disturb unduly the established way of life, and are not 
invalidated by the fact that they are contradicted by a behavior dictated by the 
daily necessities of business and politics” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 99). 
Habermas used the term “purposive rational action” to define these actions 
required through domination. Marcuse clarified the difference between pure 
science and purposive science by referring to Husserl.  The quantification of 
qualities yields exactness as well as universality and a special kind of “seeing”.  
This “seeing” of the world is seeing in a purposive context in spite of its pure 
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character. It is anticipation and projection. It is emphasized that anticipation and 
projection interpret the world in calculable relationships. Exactness is the way of 
interpretation and it is a prerequisite of the domination of nature. A question 
arises at this point as to whether the domination of nature has any effect on 
creating a domination of man. 
The philosophy of science changed the metaphysical question “what is…?” to the 
functional question “how?” and a methodology free from commitments other than 
to objective limits was thus established. It also meant that science had turned into 
an instrument. This conception of turning from metaphysical to functional 
worked as an a priori, projecting the way of the transformation of nature.  This 
projection of taking nature as an instrument can be named a technological a 
priori (Marcuse, 1964, p. 101). Since the transformation of nature involves that of 
man, and man-made products require the societal ensemble, a technological a 
priori is also a political a priori. Even though Marxian theory claims that mode 
of production, rather than technology, is the basic historical factor, Marcuse 
believed that when technique becomes the universal form, it surrounds the entire 
culture and protects the legitimacy of domination.  The relation between social 
facts and scientific facts lies at this point. While science freed nature from 
inherent ends, society freed men from the natural hierarchy of personal 
dependence and related them with quantifiable qualities. The relation between 
social quantification and scientific quantification, in Marcuse’s opinion, is as 
follows. In a given universe, cognition of data may vary since interpretation and 
theorizing can be done by taking a position in this structured and defined 
universe. However the instrumentalist character of scientific rationality is “a 
priori technology and the a priori of a specific technology, namely technology as 
a specific control and domination” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 104). The legitimacy of 
instrumental rationality expands political power and absorbs all the spheres of 
culture. All in all, Marcuse thought that the freedom of man is limited by the 
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scientific method, which provides concepts and instruments to dominate man and 
nature by man. Domination expanded as technology expanded, and technology 
absorbed all the cultural spheres. If this claim is taken as fact, one of the most 
common reactionary ways of thinking against the transformation of society is by 
embracing the inherited values and traditions of a society. Therefore, 
“conservatism” is worth analyzing. 
 
1.3 Conservatism 
 
The idea of rationalism paved the way for a new way of thinking. It meant the 
rejection of the old beliefs of everyday life and uncorroborated theories of 
science; it also meant building a new concept in thinking, production, and living 
by disregarding sacred values and beliefs. Rational thinking caused radical 
changes in the order of life, and reason began to take a central role against 
tradition, customs, and revelation in a period called the “Age of Reason” or the 
“Enlightenment”. Some scholars trace back the idea of conservatism to the birth 
of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is the symbol of the philosophical 
disengagement of the common understandings on humans and the universe; it is 
the historical process, which built new representations and was the source of the 
ideas maintained by the French Revolution.  
Kant’s description of the Enlightenment is illuminating in understanding the 
rational mind and making a brief introduction to conservative thought. Kant 
described the Enlightenment as “man’s release from his self incurred immaturity, 
by the use of his own reason, undistorted by prejudice and without the guidance 
of others” (Outram, 1995, p. 2). By following this philosophy, modern people 
began to think that the technocratic mind (or, to put it another way, setting no 
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limits on the use of technology) would be the right instrument to establish a 
utopian world. 
Marcuse and most of the Frankfurt school scholars thought that this new 
understanding of “disenchantment” or “the era of the Enlightenment” has led to 
the captivity of man, instead of freeing him as expected. Marcuse went further 
and put the politicizing power of technology and science into the center of late 
capitalist societies. It was reinterpreting science as a dominating ideology. 
On the other hand, one of the best-known and inspirational scholars of 
conservatism, Edmund Burke, stood against the idea of ignoring guidance and 
prejudice. Burke believed that the existing order contains the values and the 
natural and constant habits of people, and thus cannot be ignored, as did the 
French revolutionaries. For Burke, prejudice is rational. 
It is the collective, non-propositional knowledge of peoples, races, 
cultures: a wisdom handed down through custom and tradition… For 
Burke, prejudice is the complex of knowledge, attitudes, responses, 
and habits, which is expected for a civilized mode of life within a 
given community. Thus there is an essentially social dimension to 
prejudice. Needless to say, such a conception of prejudice is neither 
scientistic nor individualistic. But though representing neither of 
these traits of Enlightenment rationality, it possesses a kind of 
rationality, since it is composed of the wisdom of generations 
(White, 1998, pp. 2-3). 
These were the ideas of scholars criticizing some points of rationalism, at this 
point, we can take a look at the idea of conservatism. However, we cannot posit 
conservatism as a counter-argument to modernity, as there are strong conflicts 
between these two ideas. The first thing we can say about conservatism is that it 
is not an area outside of modernity; it owes its existence to modernity and stands 
alongside it. Conservatism has the ability to sustain the continuity of the ancient 
and existing order, traditions, and sacredness. It exists by reforming traditions 
against new streams. For this reason, conservatism can be characterized as 
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reactionary, or, in the words of Mannheim, “rationalized traditionalism” (Bora, 
1998, p. 54). 
For the philosophy of the Enlightenment, “reason” is a limitless power to realize 
the truth, find out the mysteries of the universe, and create a utopian world 
without the help of heritage, traditions, or religious knowledge. Reason is the 
ultimate power to discover the most supreme mission of life, and this belief 
creates an understanding of “perfectibility” (Özipek, 2011, p. 34). Contrary to the 
optimistic perception of “reason” of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, 
conservatism carries a feeling of scepticism and insecurity against a rational way 
of creating systems, universal designs, and deeds regarding society, and most of 
all against abstract notions. This conservative sense of scepticism creates a social 
pessimism, or better, a pessimism against the social. However, the paradox here is 
that the conservatives’ efforts at reforming traditions and embracing the existing 
order converts pessimism into cynicsm (Bora, 1998, p. 57). 
Burke stood against ideologies because he believed that ideologies do not cover 
the relevant issues as a whole, but rather analyze these issues from a one-
dimensional perspective. According to Burke’s view, approaching a social 
problem and its solution from a single angle cannot lead to a permanent solution, 
because truth is not one-dimensional but has multiple dimensions to consider. 
This might be the reason why Burke was not using “reason” but “wisdom” to 
denote a leading mind. Yet, prominent thinkers write on conservatism, including 
Mannheim, defined conservatism as a way of thinking rather than an ideology.  
According to conservatives, ideologies have been trying to establish an artificial 
heaven in the world. The difference between ideologies and conservative thought 
is lying beyond this claim. Conservatism is the way of making adjustments and 
reformations on the existing system, instead of creating a new one. One of the 
counter-arguments to conservatism is that sometimes it is better to remove all the 
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dysfunctional institutions from the executive branch of the state. On the other 
hand, conservative scholars think that revolutionary movements tear a society 
from its roots, traditions, and habits in an attempt to create a ‘utopia,’ instead of 
dealing with the existing society (Dural, 2006, pp. 55-66).  
Nevertheless, in the age of ideologies, conservatism itself has been representing 
an ideology even though conservatives reject the idea. Conservatism has its own 
utopia as well. However, it is not projected as a utopia but commonly taken as a 
transcendental, dignified order of life realized by obeying the commands of God. 
The reformation process supported by these religious-conservatives aims to 
resurrect the forgotten commands of God – which people once knew and then 
forgot – in order to reach the ideal societal form. In case of ignorance of this 
dignified order, conservatives believed that modern people would suffer from the 
by-products of modernism.  
Non-conservatives can interpret the conservatives’ claim of establishing a society 
according to God’s commands as utopian; furthermore, this can be seen as a 
dichotomy in conservatism. On the other hand, conservatives believe that this 
“order” had been established earlier, and that people once “had” knowledge; thus 
what is desired is a resurrection by means of reforms. To use Kirk’s description 
of conservative thought, “They think that society is a spiritual reality, possessing 
an eternal life but a delicate constitution: it cannot be scrapped and recast as if it 
were a machine” (Kirk, 2001, p. 8). 
This position of believing in a future utopia, versus believing in a past order that 
can be resurrected in the future, draws a portrait of the understanding of time in 
modernist thought and conservative thought. Modern/revolutionist thought 
ignores the past and focuses on the future, using the present only as a step to the 
future, while conservatives value the past and see the present within the heritage 
of the past. It is no accident that Mannheim questioned himself, asking whether 
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conservatism is a universal and eternal thought which encompasses all people and 
all time, or an idea that belongs to the social circumstances of recent times, one 
that includes modern cultural and political thoughts. Then he answered his 
question as “both of them”.  
I believe that Kirk’s six canons of conservatism are enlightening in drawing an 
initial frame for the characteristics of conservatism. The first canon is the “belief 
in a transcendent order”. This order rules over society as well as the conscience, 
and is claimed to be higher than people’s reason. The second canon is to believe 
in the complexity of human nature and variety in existence. Conservatives claim 
that revolutionaries ignore this complexity and reduce their policies to a uniform 
and simplistic form arranged by the use of reason and logic. The third canon is 
the conviction that society needs social classes, against the idea of the French 
Revolution’s “classless society”. For Burke, the attempt of “pure democracy” in 
France became an ignoble oligarchy. He believed that in a democracy, the 
majority of the citizens would exercise oppression upon minorities; thus, in the 
end, that could carry much more fury than a simple scepter’s dominion (1790, p. 
103). The fourth canon is the connection between property and freedom. Burke 
said that “The strong struggle in every individual to preserve possession of what 
he has found to belong to him and to distinguish him is one of the securities 
against injustice and despotism implanted in our nature” (1790, p. 114). The fifth 
canon is distrust of “sophisters, calculators and economists” since they build 
society upon an abstract system. This canon reflects an opposition against the 
idea of building a logical system based upon scientific facts and technical 
methods. The sixth canon is the recognition that change may not be the most 
appropriate reform. Hasty innovations can lead to undesired conclusions. Society 
must change not through radical changes but social preservation, something that 
is possible with prudence (Kirk, 2001, pp. 8-9). 
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David Hume’s understanding of political issues followed a conservative path. 
Hume was in favor of the oligarchic regime of Britain rather than of revolutionary 
France, because he believed that the rationalist attitudes of change might cause a 
“philosophical explosion”3. The main argument of Hume’s conservatism can be 
explained as follows. Human reason is not capable of establishing beliefs that are 
vital for everyday life. Imaginative and sensitive processes are more suitable to 
that. Therefore Hume believed in an evolutionary path toward establishing these 
beliefs. Uniformities in the human mind tend to converge on the empirical and 
moral issues of people. The implication of this argument is to discard rational 
political thought, since philosophers are not able to show the rationality of beliefs. 
Thus Hume’s doctrine of conservative thought required that ‘social and political 
institutions should be understood as devices developed in response to the 
exigencies of the human condition’ (Miller, Coleman, Connoly, & Ryan, 1986, 
pp. 227-228). 
I believe that the contrast between rational thought and conservative thought 
becomes apparent in the views of rational and conservative thinkers on the same 
subject. Especially in political thought, the conservative attitude of protecting the 
institutions and the revolutionary attitude of establishing a new order have been 
positioned against each other and embodied as ideological forms.  
An Algerian intellectual, Mustapha Cherif, asked Derrida a question concerning 
religious people in the modern world: How can Muslims be modern without 
losing their roots? How can Muslims deal with the developing modern world and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Philosophical	   explosion	   evokes	   the	   term	   “intelligence	   explosion,”	   also	   known	   as	   “singularity.”	  Singularity	   is	   an	   argument	   based	   on	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   machines	   are	   more	   intelligent	   than	  humans.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  emergence	  of	  ever	  more	  intelligent	  machines	  and	  an	  explosion	  of	  greater	  levels	   of	   intelligence	   and	   speed.	   Practical	   results	   of	   singularity	   would	   include	   curing	   diseases,	  ultimate	  economical	  improvements,	  such	  as	  ending	  poverty,	  and	  scientific	  improvements.	  However,	  it	   would	   also	   cause	   negative	   results,	   such	   as	   ending	   the	   human	   race	   and	  waging	   a	  war	   between	  machines	  and	  human	  beings.	  Philosophical	  results	  would	  be	  also	   interesting.	  The	  main	  arguments	  would	   force	  us	  to	   think	  about	   the	  nature	  of	   intelligence	  and	  the	  capabilities	  of	  machines.	   It	  would	  also	   lead	   us	   to	   think	   about	   values	   and	   morality.	   All	   in	   all,	   the	   conflict	   between	   technical	  improvements	  and	  human	  values	  would	  clearly	  be	  seen	  through	  singularity.	  (Chalmers, 2010)	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the spreading idea of rationalism? For Cherif there were at least three primary 
issues in which modernity contradicts Islam. The first one is on the level of 
meaning, by which it is claimed that modern people have fewer connections with 
religious people, especially Muslims. The second one is on the political level, 
which refers to the vanishing political existence in public opinion of such issues 
as morality, human rights, justice, and the law. The third one is on the level of 
knowledge. The rise in the demand for exact knowledge leads to scienticism, 
which damages intercultural relations, customs, and experience. What are the 
effects of scienticism and secularism in the modern world? Derrida answered that 
as a claim of positivist understanding, scienticism can be considered neither 
knowledge, nor science, and that he considered scienticism unfavorably. When it 
came to secularism, Derrida believed that in Europe, democracy will be 
constituted with secularism at the political level, while giving citizens freedom of 
worship. In his model of democracy, freedom of worship will be guaranteed by 
the state, and, unlike the present notion of secularism in France, there will be 
coherence between the state and religion. According to Derrida, the state is 
required as a guarantee for secularity. Secularity provides space not only for 
religious people, but also for those who do not want to be identified as religious. 
He said that a “religious community can very well organize itself as religious 
community, in a lay space, without invading the lay space and while respecting 
the freedom of the individual.”  He implied that this space can be protected both 
from religious and nonreligious oppression (Cherif, 2009, pp. 48-51). 
For the solution of the problem of coherence between Islam and modernity, 
Derrida pointed to a new understanding of democracy in Europe which would 
provide space for both religious and non-religious people, and would not give 
authority to either sides. In his model, the state will be the guarantor and 
democracy will be the medium of secularism as well as the existence of religious 
communities. Derrida was aware of the fact that secularism today does not 
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coincide with the image he desired. So he added that secular people must be more 
open to dialogue, and must exercise tolerance toward religious cultures in order to 
provide freedom for religious practices.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 Ottoman Scholars’ Ideas on Islam and Adaptation to the 
Modern World 
 
The task to be accomplished is not the conservation of 
the past, but the redemption of the hopes of the past. 
Today, however, the past is preserved as the 
destruction of the past.  
Adorno and Horkheimer4 
 
Having reviewed some of the great changes in western worldviews and beliefs 
that were later reshaped as a rational worldview, in this chapter we shall go 
through the effects of these changes in the Ottoman Empire, in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the changes in the conception of Islam and the views that 
built the secular Republic of Turkey. In the late Ottoman era, there were many 
attempts at modernization in economics, politics, science, and daily life. These 
attempts brought about challenges between Islamic and modern worldviews and 
led Ottoman scholars to express their own views of modernity based on Islamic 
and Western values and thoughts.  
The effects of scientific developments in the Western world in the era of 
industrialization and technology reached Ottoman-Muslim lands during the 
nineteenth century. The traditional order of society, the economy, and the law 
were challenged by the social order of the West, which was subjected to reason. 
Scholars in the Muslim world discussed the dilemma faced by Islamic societies: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  From	  the	  book	  Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment,	  Verso	  Publishing,	  1997,	  p.	  XV	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whether to follow traditions and the shariah, or create a new paradigm that would 
establish closer cultural ties with the Western world. This chapter discusses the 
responses of nineteenth-century Islamic scholars, particularly Sayyid Jamal ad-
Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, to the effects of modernity and the 
alternative solutions generated to find a way between Islamic and Western 
cultures. 
These new series of questions that Muslim scholars faced – questions that 
underscored the vital changes necessary to adapt Ottoman-Muslim society to the 
modern world – were also discussed by several orientalist scholars in Europe. 
One of the main questions was the sustainability of traditions. Against the rapidly 
changing Western world, with its new ideologies and philosophies and especially 
the mainstream thoughts of rational thinking that undertook a critique of 
traditions and religion, was it feasible or even reasonable to preserve the 
traditions of society, was it possible to reinterpret the Quran and accomplish 
reforms in the social order? What were the problems that had caused the Muslim 
world to lag behind the West?  
The Ottoman Empire faced those processes mechanically and artificially. Since 
those processes had not been confronted naturally over time as an answer to the 
demands of society, was it possible to produce an appropriate critique of 
tradition? In similar cases, one of the most common approaches had been to 
assume an absolute reference point and carry out adaptations according to that 
reference point, independently of the actual conditions of society.  For instance, 
in western colonies, the colonizers attempted to adapt the colonized societies to 
their own social order. However, the Ottoman Empire had never become a colony 
of the West. In this regard, Ottomans had to find their own model of modern 
society regarding cultural heritage and political circumstances. 
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Certain vitally important figures may help illuminate the main points of the 
problem of modernization in the Muslim world during the nineteenth century. 
One of the key figures in this regard is al-Afghani’s student Muhammad Abduh. 
Raised in Egypt and educated at al-Azhar University, Abduh received the degree 
of ‘alim in 1877, after which he taught at the same university for two years. 
During his years at al-Azhar, he was influenced by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, who 
had been traveling throughout the Muslim world and Europe to spread his ideas 
on the achievement of unity in the Muslim world. Al-Afghani’s mission was to 
organize Islamic countries and lead them to revolt against the political influence 
and economic pressure of the West, and thus to unite the entire Muslim world 
under the flag of a single caliph. Although he was known primarily for his 
political views, he also had opinions on Islamic civilization and on the synthesis 
of modernism and Islam so as to adapt Islam to the West in the context of rational 
and scientific ways. However, he did not fully develop these ideas, which were 
later further elaborated by his student Abduh; this latter symbolizes the 
reinterpretation of tradition in order to reconcile the Islamic faith and the 
scientific age. This idea, expounded by Abduh, was the main concern of the 
Ottoman Empire during that period. 
Between tradition and modernity, the Ottoman Empire had to find a way to deal 
with the social and technological standards of the West, and in this regard, 
Islamic scholars had to face critics of the traditional interpretation of Islam. These 
critics were not developed naturally in time, but originated from concerns over 
the reconciliation of Islam with the West. Gencer claims that there were two main 
obstacles resisting reconciliation. First, there is no use of the noun al-‘aql, which 
means reason, in the Quran; rather, a verb is used to point using reason (al-‘aql), 
which means to use the reason given to people. This usage is interpreted to mean 
that reason is not used autonomously by a human being, but that it clearly refers 
not to individuals but to transcendental guidance. The second issue is the 
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hermeneutical interpretation of the Quran. Using hermeneutics to interpret the 
Quran as it was used to interpret the Bible drove the Quran away from 
universalism, and created a dogmatic understanding (Gencer, 2012, p. 496). 
 
2.1 Modernism against Tradition 
	  
Traditions are part of everyday life and embody the values of society coming 
from its past, bringing them to the present with some modifications over time. In 
most cases, the strictness of traditions is supported by society, since they 
represent good values based on social relations, religion, and morality. However, 
the stability of the circumstances of society depends on economics, social 
policies, and technical improvements. External influences on this stability can 
cause defects in the system and thus traditions need to be adapted to these 
modifications.  
In a period marked in the Ottoman Empire by the dilemma between modernity 
and tradition, Abduh tended to reject the traditions instead of requiring them to 
evolve according to the new circumstances. Rejecting traditions is a less 
complicated way of reformulating Islamic attitudes in the contemporary era since 
rejection releases the boundaries of time and the burden of inherited thoughts and 
habits from the origin of Islam. According to Abduh, Islam as an institution was 
centered on the individual’s direct relationship with God by appealing to the Holy 
Book. Like the classical salafis Abduh followed the way of Ibn Taymiyah’s 
discourse on ijtihad (juristic reasoning) and defended the inevitable role of reason 
in Islam.  
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Abduh and his followers supported the idea of going back to the origin of shariah 
as well as linking to the essence of the faith by releasing society from the 
boundaries of tradition. Abduh defined his position as follows: 
I spoke out on behalf of two great causes. The first of these was the 
liberation of thought from the chains of imitation and the 
understanding of religious faith as the members of the early 
Community understood it before dissension arose, and the return of 
religious learning to its original sources, and consideration of 
religion in the scales of human intelligence that God created to repel 
the excesses of faith and diminish its errors and stumbling, so that 
the human social order prescribed by God in His wisdom may be 
attained. In this way religion may be counted the true friend of 
science, a stimulus for inquiry into the secrets of the universe, and an 
appeal to respect established truths and rely upon them in cultivating 
our spirits and reforming our actions (Rida, 1931, pp. 11-12). 
As mentioned above, Abduh embraced the simplicity of religion by appealing to 
its primary source, the Holy Book. By using it as a reference, he claimed that man 
can use his own reason to explore beyond what is known and this methodology 
goes well with science and technology. He supported his argument by giving an 
example from Prophet Muhammad’s life. Abduh said that Prophet Muhammad 
banned tree grafting, but after this ban, the trees’ yield decreased and so he 
decided to rescind the ban. Abduh interpreted this case with the limits of divine 
knowledge. He said that prophets had divine knowledge about religious issues 
and there could be no doubt on this count; however, in rescinding the tree-
grafting ban, the Prophet gave his followers the message that issues related to 
human development and daily life are open to research and discussion. People 
have to develop and use their experiences in their lives (Abduh, 1986, p. 134). 
However, Abduh’s position was still paradoxical since the western path to 
modernization and the Enlightenment were considered to be rooted solely in 
reason. In interpreting the logical system of Abduh’s rationality, Rashid Rida 
argued that according to Abduh, reason and revelation cannot contradict each 
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other and they are only different paths that lead to the one truth. Abduh explained 
that there are two kinds of conclusions; one is decisive (qat’i) and the other is 
suppositional (zanni). Decisive conclusions of both reason and revelation must 
always be in agreement. If most of the indications from both sides are 
suppositional then it is subject to interpretation (ta’wil). Reason offers grounds to 
validate religious doctrine and confirms its coherence. In the end, if rational 
investigation fails, the case should remain as known only to God (Kerr, 1966, p. 
110). 
Abduh and his student Rashid Rida believed that Muslims stopped practicing 
Islamic law (Shariah) because of its inadaptability to the modern age. For this 
reason, Abduh argued for the importance of a revolution by practicing ijtihad in 
religion, which would be the projection of the revolution that occurred in the 
West and resulted in the secularization process. This argument has two 
problematical aspects. First, secularization is the end product of a long process of 
thought and revolutions in the West. Abduh’s intention of applying a practical 
solution by focusing on the end product cannot be considered to be a genuine 
solution for Islamic society. Second, from the perspective of Abduh as well as 
some other scholars, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) did not coincide with modern 
jurisprudence, and this causes problems in terms of adaptation to the modern 
world.  
 
2.2 The Tradition of Islamic Jurisprudence and Methodologies 
	  
Etymologically fiqh means intelligence and knowledge, and it is the name given 
to Islamic jurisprudence. It covers all the aspects of Muslims’ existence, 
including religion, politics, business, and everyday life, and regulates them 
according to Islamic law. Traditional fiqh literature and methods date from the 
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second half of the eighth century, and fiqh remained as jurists’ law that was 
discussed and developed by Islamic scholars until the nineteenth century  
(Johansen, 2009, pp. 315-318). 
During the development of Islamic sciences, fiqh acquired the leading position. In 
the eleventh century, we see the examples of madrasas that specialized in a 
certain school of fiqh. Indeed, there are different schools of fiqh, and each 
individual can choose the one to follow from among them. Since fiqh as a jurists’ 
law produces norms that constitute laws for individuals and particularly 
emphasizes their subjective rights, different schools of thought present a range of 
ideas on each specific issue that can be considered evidence of the dynamic 
structure of fiqh. These schools may follow different methods, different sources 
on particular issues, or they may interpret the texts in different ways, but they all 
use certain basic sources considered valid. For the Sunni schools of law, these 
confirmed sources or methods are the Quran, the sayings and practices of the 
Prophet (sunnah), consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). The latter is a method, 
while the others are recognized as sources. For the Shi’i schools of thought, the 
sources are the Quran, the sayings and practices of the Prophet and the Imams 
(leaders from the Alid line), and, instead of analogy (qiyas), Shi’i scholars use 
reason (aql) and rational thought. Fiqh is valuable in terms of Islamic sciences in 
part because of its rigor in protecting the authenticity of its sources. In other 
respects, this commitment to sources is a disadvantage in terms of adapting to a 
world that changes rapidly. Another value of fiqh is the importance given to 
variation in the thoughts of individual jurists and the ways of different schools of 
thought. For this reason, a literary genre called dissent (khilaf) was produced, and 
it historically represented the respect accorded to licit differences among the fiqh 
schools.  
All in all, fiqh encompasses all the issues of Muslims’ lives, regulating them 
based on a body of rules. Moreover, fiqh has a dynamic structure with a multi-
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dimensional perspective, and it is open to debate and reinterpretation based on the 
sources. Fiqh was enriched over time by inheriting different values and 
perspectives as the Muslim lands expanded and encompassed different cultures 
each with their own law codes and traditions.  
When it came to the sources of fiqh, Abduh had different views. He argued that 
the students of Vasil bin Ata had believed in the necessity of scientific proofs for 
Islamic beliefs (akide). However, they could not distinguish scientifically proven 
beliefs from those arising from their suspicions. For this reason, he thought that 
non-religious ideas leaked into religion, and that this did not stop until many 
madhhabs had flourished (Abduh, 1986, p. 86). As a result of this view, Abduh 
had a skeptical approach to fiqh, while supporting ijtihad.   
Fundamentalist scholars thought that a new interpretation of Islamic law could be 
derived from the sources in light of economic, social, and political needs. As he 
was such a scholar, Abduh believed that the preservation of societies does not 
only depend on human reason but also on submission to God and the Divine 
Order (1986, p. 151). However, he was not only a religious revolutionary. Abduh 
also believed that religious revolution is a step in social revolution (İşcan, 1998, 
p. 218).  
The modern way of criticizing traditions and reinterpreting the sources uses an 
ideological discourse to alter the meanings of traditional terms. Abduh gave new 
meanings to traditional Islamic terms such as ijma, ijtihad, shura, and maslaha in 
order to adapt them to the modern world in the process of transforming traditions. 
Thus, maslaha became “benefit,” shura became “parliamentary democracy,” ijma 
became “public opinion,” and religion became “civilization” to support the 
mission of development (Hourani, 1962, p. 144).  
Abduh’s intention of changing Islamic terms re-regulated Muslims’ lives from the 
economic to the political domain, and this bears a resemblance to the idea of 
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disenchantment in Europe. Beyond changing terminology, Abduh believed that 
referring directly to the main sources would release the boundaries of tradition 
from social life and open a space for rationality in dealing with social life. I 
believe that Abduh’s understanding of religion and his thoughts on adapting it to 
the modern world without abandoning fundamental Muslim thoughts and his 
reinterpretation of the terms of social life constitute a kind of modernity. In 
Abduh’s understanding of theology, the content of religion points to inner 
dimensions, such as submission to God, respecting the Prophet Muhammad, and 
respecting the Quran. There is no room for mysticism in Abduh’s theology, as he 
refers to the original sources alone. According to him, early Islam had a more 
rational character and instead of deepening religion, his theology acquired an 
“apologetic compromise” by turning back to authenticity (Gibb & Kramers, 
1953). For me, Abduh’s intention was to create separate spaces for religion and 
reason. He allocated a personal space for religion and a common space in society 
for reason. I believe that he was not in favor of using fiqh practices in common 
affairs, since he believed that they were incompatible with the contemporary 
world. Thus, in his own way, Abduh opened a gate to modernity for Islamic 
society. His vision dealt with an alternative modernity, one that suited the spirit of 
the culture in which it flourished. 
During the same period in the Ottoman capital, there were also discussions and 
conflicts about altering the legal system and adopting one based on modern law 
instead of fiqh. This alteration did not only mean systematic changes in the legal 
system, such as agreeing upon fixed codes in certain issues and forming courts 
specialized in certain issues. Beyond that, there was also the Ottoman notion of 
justice as law; protecting the lives and property of the Empire’s subjects, fighting 
against unjust governing, and supporting the oppressed. The notion of justice was 
also a motivation and a political principle that was not clearly defined in written, 
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rational codes, since this notion was different for each case based on the factors 
that created them.  
The reliability of the Ottoman legal system was seen as the main obstacle against 
standardization for Western observers. In Weber’s studies and in the studies of 
Western political consultants, the Ottoman legal system was interpreted as non-
rational. Beyond non-rationality and a non-Cartesian system of thinking, fiqh had 
its own model of knowledge in which the practice of law depends on regional and 
personal factors, and decisions are made based upon local customs and beliefs. In 
this sense, there was not a one-dimensional, fixed decision for each issue; rather, 
there was plurality based on the facts that made that case unique, such as region, 
family, and customs. Decisions were not made based on the personal opinions of 
the qadis (religious judges); rather, they benefited from the Quran through which 
they gave meaning to the order of the whole universe at the macro level, and to 
social life at the micro level.  
During the period of revolutions in the late nineteenth century, Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha studied Islamic law as a legislator to make a codification in law.  The aim 
of this study was to make the reforms of the Tanzimat easier and to standardize 
the rules of fiqh in the entire Empire. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha supported this study 
rather than the transferring of the codes from Europe, because he claimed that to 
transfer another culture’s codes would lead to the deformation of the nation.  
At this point, I would like to emphasize that the attempts to make reforms were 
centered on Islamic principles. However, there were not only religious concerns 
in those attempts. On the one hand, there was pressure to modernize the empire 
according to the norms of Europe, and on the other, there was a society with its 
own cultural roots formed and developed through the centuries. In that highly 
politicized environment, these were attempts to find the middle ground between 
Western modernization and the basic principles governing Islamic societies. 
	  	   40 
2.3 Mehmet Akif’s Opinions on Abduh’s Thoughts 
	  
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were many political 
movements in Ottoman lands, among which only a few were widely accepted. 
According to Akçura’s best-known article “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Types of 
Politics), which reflects quite clearly the political environment of the day, three 
political movements dominated the scene: Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and 
Turkish nationalism. While scholars like Ahmed Cevdet Pasha adopted the stance 
of nationalism, the poet Mehmed Akif opposed this idea.  
In an article written around 1903-1904, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey (who was originally 
from Azerbaijan) indicated that four or five years before the first proclamation of 
the Constitutional Monarchy (Birinci Meşrutiyet, 1876), he and his friends had 
begun to publish a newspaper when new ideas began to flourish in the Turkic-
Islamic world. Scholars were searching for the means of survival by empowering 
the Turkic-Islamic world against the Western world. At the time, there were 
basically three movements in the Islamic world: The Wahhabis, who closed the 
doors of religion to reforms and new interpretations; Afghani and Abduh’s way of 
reinterpreting religious sources based on the principles of Islam; and 
Westernization through submission to the ideas of the Western world (Fergan, 
2011, p. 68). 
Mehmed Akif’s views were closer to Abduh’s revolutionary ideas and the notion 
of multiple modernities. Al-Afghani and Abduh were followers of the reformist 
Islamist way in Egypt, while Mehmed Akif followed a parallel way in the 
Ottoman capital. Akif published translations of Abduh’s writings in his journals 
Sırat-ı Müstakim and Sebilürreşad, and had similar views, as can also be seen in 
his own writings.  
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Some scholars today claim that although there are parallels between the thoughts 
of Akif and Abduh, their inspirations and sources were different. According to 
others, however, Akif directly supported the ideas of Abduh’s rationalist Islam 
model, and he can be considered his follower. İsmail Kara and Sezai Karakoç 
support the first argument. Kara points first to the argument behind Abduh’s 
thesis, which was to reread and reinterpret the sources and create a new 
perspective in light of Islamic primary sources while ignoring any traditional 
knowledge believed to stray from the original form of Islam. Here, Kara asks how 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars could have noticed deviations from 
original sources that previous Islamic scholars had not seen. For Kara, this was 
not a revolutionary religious movement; rather, it was a movement of salvation. 
In the Islamic world, under the circumstances of colonization, setbacks, and 
serious threats, there was a lack of technology and technical instrument and 
military power, and this salvation movement symbolized an awakening, leading 
to developments and improvements by rediscovering Islam. In his masterpiece 
Safahat, Akif problematized the issue of setbacks. He said that instead of reading 
and improving on inherited knowledge, young people had been dragged into a 
hopeless situation over the last two to three centuries. Kara emphasized the 
revolutionary character of Akif and represented him as a conditional supporter of 
modernism which he viewed as the way to salvation. Akif had parallel ideas with 
Islamic modernism that were based upon the primary Islamic sources and simple 
and practical approaches which covered actions more than theory, removing 
superstitions and baseless beliefs from religion, opening the gates of ijtihad, 
improving the educational system, and taking the West as a model in science and 
art (Kara, 2011, p. 343). 
Karakoç also argued that Akif was not a follower of Abduh. The similarity 
between the thoughts of Akif and Abduh was that they both reflected the common 
perspective of early twentieth-century Islamic thought. Akif’s views as articulated 
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in his poems and articles had been developed from family, common culture, 
society, and state. Abduh, on the other hand, had the inclination of developing a 
new system of thinking and state-building by looking at the primary Islamic 
sources. In other words, Karakoç claimed that even though Akif translated 
Abduh’s writings and benefited from them, there was an ontological difference 
between their thoughts. While the Egyptian modernist’s aim was to create a new 
understanding of Islam as a system, Akif’s aim was to revive the spirit of Islam 
through the existing system of society (Karakoç, 2007, pp. 22-24). 
The scholars who claimed that Akif had been a follower of Abduh based their 
arguments on Akif’s articles and poetry. A common example given from Safahat 
indicates Akif’s desire for revolution, much like Abduh. However the method of 
this revolution did not seek to dismiss the government and create chaos in the 
country. On the contrary, it suggested achieving a smooth transformation of 
society by means of education and opening schools. Moreover, an anthology of 
works on Mehmed Akif prepared by one of his friends, Eşref Edib Fergan, as well 
as excerpts from Akif’s works, also gave the impression that Akif had followed 
the way of Abduh. In one of these excerpts, Akif said that he had been translating 
Abduh’s articles for two years and saw no evidence of influence of the Wahhabi 
School in those articles (Akif, Sırat-ı Müstakim, 1326). In another article, he 
mentioned societies’ obsession for protecting traditions, the results of which leads 
to the prevention of any improvements. Akif also emphasized the fact that some 
of scholars ignored all traditions for the sake of embracing Western culture (Akif, 
Sebilürreşad, 1330, p. 4).  
In many articles, Akif pointed out the importance of reason (aql) in Islam by 
referring to the words of the Prophet. In one of his sayings (hadith), the Prophet 
declared that “Religion is the substance of reason. If a man has no reason, he has 
no religion” (al-Hindi, p. 7033). In many other examples from daily life, Akif 
showed ways of using reason to understand Islamic law and abandon the false 
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beliefs produced by society. These examples show that Akif’s way of thinking 
had great similarities with that of Abduh, and he had sympathy for Abduh, an 
attitude that could be qualified as a master-follower relationship.  
 
2.4 Mehmed Akif’s Opinion of Science and Western Civilization 
	  
Reviewing the ideas of Egyptian Muslim modernist Abduh and al-Afghani and 
their visions, plans, and position in the fiqh tradition provides historical 
background that leads to a deeper understanding of Akif’s ideas and vision, since 
he was sharing many basic principles with them.  
Several theses and articles have been written on Mehmed Akif’s ideas on 
tradition and modernity. Coming from a middle class family, Akif was involved 
in social and political discussions based on concerns of the society. Contrary to 
the top-down revolutionaries who ignored the culture and norms of their own 
society, Akif’s thoughts and vision suggested a smoother transition from a 
traditional society to a contemporary society while preserving the elements of the 
society’s identity. For this reason, his practical solutions and way of thinking can 
be examined to build a model of his vision, and this model can be compared with 
Turkey’s current social and political visions.  
For Enlightenment scholars, reason was taken as a guide. For Akif, who based 
himself on the Prophet’s saying “Religion is the substance of reason. If a man has 
no reason, he has no religion,” the guide was the Quran. The Quran is the 
representation of reason itself, in the light of belief. Thus, the Quran was taken as 
the guidance on the path of modernity, Akif’s definition of which was salvation 
from an idle position while obtaining improvement in science and technology. 
His method of reaching modernity involved, first and foremost, separating 
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western culture from western technology. In other words, instead of westernizing 
as a whole, he was only interested in acquiring science and technology from the 
West. He believed that it was possible to modernize a country without complete 
westernization, and Japan was a remarkable example in this sense. The focal 
point here is the connections between past and future, and Akif used a tree 
metaphor to describe these connections. Just like the branches of a tree that is 
connected to the earth with its roots, he argued, society must be connected to the 
roots of its past. A tree without roots would die; thus all the branches of a tree 
must be fed through the roots (Yetiş, p. 138-143). Establishing a connection 
between branches and roots reflects the desire to make adaptations in the doctrine 
of religion for the contemporary world instead of cutting down the tree and 
raising a new tree from the roots, which is to desire a total transformation as in 
the example of Abduh and al-Afghani. At this point, different than Abduh and al-
Afghani, Akif was consequently in favor of smooth adaptation rather than 
revolution in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and during the establishment 
of the Turkish republic.  
In Akif’s writings, there was also harsh criticism of government policies. The 
government’s use of Islamic values as a pressure factor to control the society was 
defended with the excuse of the circumstances of the era. For Akif, this was a 
pragmatic use of religion. Akif claimed that the government put pressure on its 
subjects to prevent new ideas and progressive movements, and to achieve this 
aim, Islamic pillars were used as obstacles. This misrepresentation of religion was 
internalized by society and shaped its understanding of Islam (Sırat-ı Müstakim, 
1328). 
Basically, Akif’s conception of faith and his perception of religion require 
rethinking and questioning the traditions that made him known as a reformist in 
that era. In an article in his journal Sıratü’l-Müstakim, he wrote that any scholar 
from any religion must be respected. This means that he did not have strict ideas 
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about Islamic partisanship; on the contrary, he had respect and tolerance for other 
beliefs. In his critique of one of the writings of Abdullah Cevdet, he said that the 
salvation of the state can be reached by uniting Muslim groups under the roof of 
Islamic discourse, and then uniting non-Muslim groups with the bond of 
homeland. When it comes to the idea of progress, he was aiming for the progress 
of the entire society rather than that of a group of people. In education, Akif 
promoted courtesy to scholars and activists who felt responsible for the progress 
of society, and informed his readers about their works to create awareness within 
society. For Akif, welfare meant educating not only a small group of people but 
society as a whole (Akif, Sebilürreşad, 1337). Thus, he supported the idea of 
simplifying language in order to help all members of society understand what was 
written in newspapers and periodicals. In supporting the simplification of 
language, he gave an example from a Crimean newspaper, saying that it had 
successfully formed a simplified language without losing the beauty of Ottoman 
Turkish (Akif, Sırat-ı Müstakim, 1328). This is a characteristic thought of Akif: 
making revolution without losing the traces of heritage and values.   
All in all, Akif’s point was to accomplish reforms in the correct perception of 
Islam. In his writings, he mostly complained about the baseless norms produced 
over time by society that were still being taken for granted without questioning. 
In response, Akif adopted an dynamic and critical way of writing. In matters 
related to daily life, he supported a scientific approach, while in the case of faith 
and morality, he leaned on Islam.  
 
2.5 Creating Multiple Modernities 
	  
The social theorists of the nineteenth century, such as Marx, Weber, and 
Durkheim, pointed to a modernity that had flourished in Europe. As their ideas 
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spread throughout the world, this vision of modernity would be taken as a model 
for all modernizing societies. However, as can be seen in the case of nineteenth-
century Egyptian scholars, adopting modernity did not directly actualized. 
Structural differences, as well as dissimilar belief systems and inherited 
traditions, were the major causes of variability in a wide range of institutions in 
most of the societies outside Europe. In the first place, the definition and 
organization of family life, educational system, political structure, economy, 
urban life and relations all varied greatly by region, and these variations in social 
structures caused different ideological and institutional patterns. These patterns 
did not necessarily conform to the western type of modernity since they were 
greatly influenced by their own historical and cultural backgrounds. The term 
“multiple modernities” was developed in order to explain such variations 
(Eisenstadt, 2000, pp. 1-3). 
The term “multiple modernities” suggests a conception of modernity as multi-
dimensional and culture-related, rather than as uni-dimensional and culture-
independent. This approach criticizes the overarching character of modernity and 
supports enrichment in light of different cultures and historical backgrounds. 
Nilüfer Göle has proposed a program to elaborate a conceptualization of 
modernities outside the western world. The first step of her program is to shift the 
center of modernity from the West to local points and construct a synchronizing 
model between western modernities and these local points. The following steps 
are to identify the extreme moderns and focus on the decline of traditions. In 
order to shift the center of modernity from the West, it is necessary first to change 
the common perspective. Normally, to analyze modernity, non-western countries 
are considered with respect to the standards of western countries. What Göle 
offers is to reverse this consideration by understanding the relations of non-
western countries with modernity. This evaluation makes visible the active 
relations between non-western countries and modernity, rather than the generally 
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assumed passive relations. On the other hand, western modernity retains the role 
of pioneering modernity and leading the innovations, while the agenda of non-
western societies concerns synchronizing themselves with the West.  
As mentioned earlier, Abduh’s intention was not to adopt all the cultural elements 
of Western modernity. The first step in his plan was to eliminate the baseless 
interpretations and superstitions that had invaded religion. In this respect, he 
believed that fiqh traditions had to be revised in order to build a proper 
understanding of Islam. The second step was to find solutions to the new era’s 
problems. In an age in which the world was rapidly changing, immense questions 
in many aspects of everyday life confronted scholars. Abduh believed that a more 
dynamic system was required to deal with these issues. It is significant that he 
was aware of the real need to find solutions to these social issues. He believed 
that to deal with the modern world, it was first necessary to understand the logic 
of the western mind instead of directly transferring science and technology from 
the West. Moreover, Abduh asserted the importance of identifying the strong 
points of western civilization, which in his opinion were morality, art, commerce, 
and justice.  
For Abduh, the weakest points that prevented Muslims from achieving progress 
were the lack of spirit to make progress in development and lack of focus. 
According to him, modern civilization works as a key to solve these problems by 
providing guidance with its scientific perception. Abduh chose to stand between 
traditionalists and followers of westernization (İşcan, 1998). In this regard, I 
believe that Abduh’s position is coherent with the notion of creating alternative 
modernities articulated by Eisenstadt, who wrote: 
The attraction of many of modernity’s themes and institutional 
forms for many groups in these societies was caused first by the fact 
that it was the European (later the Western) pattern, developed and 
spread throughout the world by Western economic, technological, 
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and military expansion, that undermined the cultural premises and 
institutional cores of these ancient society. The appropriation of 
these themes and institutions permitted many in non-European 
societies – especially elites and intellectuals – to participate actively 
in the new modern universal (albeit initially Western) tradition, 
while selectively rejecting many of its aspects – most notably that 
which took for granted the hegemony of the Western formulations of 
the cultural program of modernity (2000, p. 14). 
The position of creating a new collective identity without giving up the main 
components of traditional identities described above is a cornerstone of Abduh’s 
social plan and can be seen as adopting a modern attitude while holding an 
Islamic worldview.  
Nilüfer Göle has said that one of the most important characteristics of modernity 
is simply its capacity for continuous self-correction. This requires empirical data, 
which are not absolute and can be refuted by new experimental results. In this 
manner, solely embracing the scientific (ilm) perspective of the West instead of 
focusing on the inherited knowledge and transformation of the Muslim World 
could not survive as an “ideology.” For ages, Muslims have embraced immensely 
different cultures by means of translations, conquests, commerce, travel, and 
political relations. A profound understanding of Islamic civilization can only be 
achieved by understanding these “networks” and by benefiting from Islamic 
philosophy to realize the concept of divine knowledge, ontology, and reason 
(aql).  
Referring to the epigraph from Adorno and Horkheimer at the beginning of the 
present chapter, in an environment that perpetuates itself by the destruction of the 
past, Abduh’s ideas could be taken as the rekindling of hopes to form an 
idiosyncratic modernity and as a motivation to follow those hopes. I believe that 
Akif was supporting Abduh’s ideas in this respect. However there is a difference 
between ignoring inherited knowledge entirely and ignoring superstitions that 
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appeared gradually over time. Abduh’s model of referring back to primary 
sources was not sustainable since society had changed over time, and societies 
benefited from fiqh only for religious practices rather than in every parts of daily 
life. I believe that alternative modernities create a space that makes it possible to 
preserve culture and adapt to western societies in the social, political, and 
economic domains. In the next chapter, I discuss the politics of the Republic of 
Turkey which, after all those reform attempts and policies of the late Ottoman 
era, preferred to abandon Islamic references entirely and establish a country based 
on the principles and values of the West. The following chapter further examines 
what kind of space these policies produced in the interstice between the policies 
of the state and the culture of the people.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 Turkish Political History and the Engineers 
 
3.1 Construction of a New Identity 
	  
In 1923, a new Turkish state emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, 
after World War I had broken up the Empire’s territory into successor nation 
states. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey was led by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, who had originally been an Ottoman soldier and later the commander of 
the Turkish national movement in the War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı).  
On the verge of the establishment of the new state, Mustafa Kemal had to 
confront head on certain questions as to the type of the regime he was founding. 
Some of his supporters in the national struggle were conservative and wanted to 
preserve the traditions of the 600-year-old reign of the Ottoman dynasty, seeing 
no alternative to a constitutional monarchy under the rule of the caliph as spiritual 
leader and head of the Assembly. According to them, the constitution of the state 
had to be written in light of the principles of shariah, and the caliph would ensure 
that shariah was not violated. However, Mustafa Kemal and some of his other 
supporters believed that a new order was required to establish and develop the 
new state and to be in harmony with the progress of Western countries (Ahmad, 
1993, pp. 52-53). They considered an Islamic state to be an obstacle to the 
transformation of the new Turkey into a modern state. Within this group, a 
Kemalist ideology emerged during the establishment of the modern, secular 
Turkish state. As the official ideology of the newly founded Turkish state, 
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Kemalism had two main objectives: elaboration of the modernist agenda and 
adaptation of Western norms through a process called “westernization,” and 
giving the state a national character. The realization of this dual process under the 
name of Kemalist ideology represented the only path that the new state could 
follow (Yerasimos, 1987, p. 66). 
In order to eliminate any ambiguity that may result from the clash between the 
conservative and modernist tendencies, and for the realization of the Kemalist 
agenda, the first move was to clarify the governmental bodies of the state. 
Mustafa Kemal’s proposal was to amend the constitution so that Turkey would be 
a republic governed under a president selected by the National Assembly. As a 
result of this political move, Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president of 
the Turkish Republic. However, the social and political environment was still not 
ready to implement Kemalist principles. Parliamentary decisions were not enough 
to erase the remnants of the monarchy. Furthermore, the institution of the 
caliphate, with its strong ties to Ottoman history, still existed and had a political 
presence and influence in the Muslim World. The Kemalists wished to eliminate 
all references to the Islamic-Ottoman past as well as any institutional 
representation of the Muslim World.  
Since the caliphate and other Islamic institutions were still in existence, reforms 
made by Mustafa Kemal and his associates could be interfered with by supporters 
of the old regime by using the symbols of Islam. To prevent this and relieve the 
newly founded state from its Islamic-Ottoman roots, the Grand National 
Assembly abolished the caliphate and the Ottoman family was exiled from the 
Republic of Turkey. This was the beginning of the secular program of the new 
Turkish state. 
Also in accordance with this agenda, the idea that Ottomans were glorious 
ancestors was devalued in order to loosen society’s ties with its Ottoman heritage. 
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In the case of loosening the idea of an Islamic state, Kemal said that Islamic states 
had been misled by distorted ideas and were destroyed by their enemies 
(Yerasimos, 1987, pp. 76-77). Given the abandonment of the memory of an 
Ottoman heritage and Islamic origin, a new ideology was needed to counter it. 
This new ideology was built upon “the history, the soul, the customs of the 
nation,” in Mustafa Kemal’s words. According to official ideology, the origins of 
the Turkish nation, before Ottomans and Islam, were supposedly Sumerians and 
Hittites. As in the case of other modern nations, the Turkish Republic constructed 
its national identity on a mythical past. From the perspective of Mustafa Kemal, 
the notion of culture represented the civilizational background. For him, the 
origin of civilization took root in ancient Greece, not in Christian and Muslim 
civilizations. This interpretation created a neutral medium that aided in positing 
ties to western civilization, since the national culture of Turkey was said to have 
the same background as western cultures (Göle, 2008, p. 86). 
 
3.2 Westernization 
	  
During the process of constructing a new identity apart from Turkey’s Muslim-
Ottoman identity, several refoms in different areas were completed in a short 
time. Kemalists, who were the founders of these reforms, were also the leading 
group of them. In a society in which classes in the modern sense were not yet 
fully formed, Kemalists saw themselves as the leader of the people and 
accelerator of the reforms. The slogan of those years was “Let us smash the 
idols!” and it was put into action on the iconic values and issues of society, such 
as upholding shariah law. In 1926, the government introduced the Italian Penal 
Code, the German and Italian Commercial Codes, and the Swiss Civil Code. In 
addition to legislation, attire, the unit of measure, and the calendar system were 
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altered and the activities of mystical orders were banned. The main goal of these 
attempts was to break off the Republic’s ties to Islam and the Ottoman heritage, 
and the common point of all the attempts was that they were not organic to 
society but were implemented from above by the government.  
One of the most significant reforms was the “Script Revolution” of 1928. It 
would be an oversimplification to consider this reform merely a case of 
“adaptation to Western norms”; in fact, it has had deeper and long-term effects on 
cultural memory and on the traditions of society. After the Script Reform, it was 
no longer possible for new generations to read and understand books written or 
printed in Ottoman (Arabic) script, and books written in western languages 
became more familiar to them than those in Ottoman, Persian, or Arabic. Almost 
a century has passed since the Script Reform but its effects continue to be 
discussed in academia. In an interview, Şerif Mardin revived the problem of the 
new generations’ inability to read Ottoman script, saying that studying the 
Tanzimat Era of the Ottoman Empire was so hard precisely because students 
could not read Ottoman; thus they had to use secondary sources, making their 
study almost impossible (Mardin, 2004, p. 8). In the early 1970s, this problem 
was portrayed by a well-known engineer politician, Necmettin Erbakan, as an 
attempt to break society’s ties with the Islamic scientific tradition (Erbakan, 1974, 
pp. 9-45). 
The Kemalists claimed that the relatively high rate of illiteracy in Ottoman 
society was the result of the difficulty in learning Ottoman script and 
orthography, and  that it would be easier to learn how to read and write in Latin 
script; thus, the Script Reform was said to be necessary to increase the rate of 
literacy. Pursuing populist policies, Mustafa Kemal proposed to simplify the 
language as well as the alphabet in order to reduce the gap between the cultural 
elite and the rest of society. Also, eliminating Arabic and Persian words from 
Ottoman would create a new language that better represented Turkish identity.  
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In this environment, there were two cultures worth mentioning. The first was the 
secular, westernized culture of a tiny but powerful minority that held the power of 
the bureaucracy, namely the Kemalists. The second was the indigenous culture of 
the masses associated with Islam. The elites or rulers adapted themselves to 
western culture, and this added a further dimension to the alienation of the elites 
from the masses, the rulers from the ruled. After World War II, this portrait 
changed with the development of a viable political opposition, and this was the 
beginning of the Islamic reassertion in the history of the Republic of Turkey. 
Modernity was a precondition of Kemalist ideology, and secularism an 
instrument to create a national identity based on “universal” values.5  After 
creating a universal identity, the following step was to create a national economy. 
Kemalists believed that without economic sovereignty there could be no political 
sovereignty, the two were inseparable. Even before the announcement of the 
Republic, the organization in 1923 of the Economic Congress of Izmir was a sign 
of this desire for economic sovereignty. After all, in the writings of the era, 
economics represented the basis of a modern state, and the continuation of the 
Kemalist reforms was directly related to a sound economy.  
The government took responsibility for creating an idealized environment and 
embracing the universal values mentioned above. As stated earlier, in the case of 
Turkey, these reforms did not occur as natural responses from Turkish society 
over time; instead they were sanctions imposed by the government. State 
intervention was not limited to defending the reforms. In the field of economics, 
intervention gradually became the official policy of the state. 
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  Unversal	  values	  represent	  the	  rational	  values	  systematized	  by	  West.	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3.3 Economy Politics and Etatism 
	  
In the economic domain, after the Great Crash in 1929, crises occurred 
throughout the capitalist world. The consequence of these crises in Turkey was 
the growth of state intervention, a development that led to a stronger monoparty 
system. After the War of Independence, the relations between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union were good, and it was decided that Turkey could benefit from the 
industrialization experiences of the Soviets. In 1931, a Russian delegation came 
to Turkey to craft a report on which industries could be established in Turkey, as 
well as the feasible locations and estimated costs of such facilities. The ideas 
derived from this report were formulated in the direction of greater state 
intervention in Turkey. During the following year, a journal named Kadro was 
founded by ideologues who supported state intervention and the continuation of 
the republican reforms. In all fields, such as economics, education, and health, 
comprehensive planning was necessitated and had to be carried out by dedicated 
cadres (kadro) (Okyar, 1965, p. 100). The state’s intervention in the economy led 
to etatism, which became one of the six fundamental principles (“Six Arrows”) of 
the ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP). In the party program, etatism was 
defined as follows:  
Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one 
of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters when 
the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially 
in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to 
prosperity in as short a time as possible.  
The interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual 
builder, as well as to encourage private enterprises, and also to 
regulate and control the work that is being done. 
The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the 
State depends upon the requirements of the greatest public interest of 
the nation. If the enterprise, which the State itself decides to 
undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in the hands of 
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private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend 
upon the enactment of a law, which will indicate the way in which 
the State shall indemnify the loss sustained by the private enterprise 
as a result of this appropriation. In the estimation of the loss the 
possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration 
(Webster, 1939, pp. 308-309). 
Thus, the main principles of etatism had been articulated; however, the 
ideologues of the time did not state exactly what they had in mind. Even tone of 
the aims of choosing etatism for the economy was for the bourgeoisie to develop, 
abandoning the chances of development leading to centralizing, totalitarian 
tendencies in the party. In 1935, the party and the state were identified as united 
when Recep Peker, the party’s Secretary General, stated that the fundamental 
principles of the party would henceforth also be those of the state. In this case, the 
party became the ideological vanguard of the state. For example, the etatist policy 
of the era required the participation of citizens in the development process. 
Accordingly, towards the 1950s, 500 People’s Houses and, in small villages, 
4000 People’s Rooms were established. These establishments were directly under 
the supervision of the Party and were managed by teachers. Beyond cultural 
activities, the aim of these houses and rooms were to enlighten the people about 
the party program. However, only middle-class urban citizens were reached 
within this plan and the aim of bringing the center closer to the periphery failed 
(Göle, 2008, pp. 94-95). In this environment, revolutionaries established a 
modernized state structure without making changes in the social and economic 
systems that reached the periphery. The rural parts of Turkey in which almost 
80% of the population lived were thus not affected by these structural changes 
(Ahmad, 1977, pp. 7-8). 
Industrialization was one of the key dimensions of the Kemalist plans to build a 
new Turkey. The Kemalists considered industry a sign of advanced civilization; 
in this respect, industrialization, technological improvements, and, relatedly, an 
independent industrialized economy were intended to achieve the goal of a high 
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level of civilization. Industrialization was also the main justification for etatism, 
who were thinking that it would be a short-cut to the goal of civilization. The 
industrialization movement also represented a strong image of democracy and 
reform (Ahmad, 1993, p. 93). To realize this goal, reforms were made in 
university education to open the way for an emerging class of technicians, 
engineers, and bureaucrats to staff public enterprises.  
In the meantime, while officials and the intelligentsia were demanding change 
and supporting the reforms, merchants and landowners did not trust the state as it 
was threatening their interests through land reform and monopolies. There were 
contradictions between the tendencies of the emerging bourgeoisie and the 
national identity formed by the state. Also, the effects of state intervention caused 
tension between the emerging bourgeoisie and the Kemalist intelligentsia. The 
attempt to create a national capitalism by using the state apparatus and the ruling 
party reached its limits. The bourgeoisie was ready to take the lead and integrate 
itself into the world market (Yerasimos, 1987, p. 91). 
 
3.4 The Era of the Democrat Party 
	  
The year 1945 marks an important landmark for Turkish political history, because 
the often-voiced intention of developing a multi-party regime finally became a 
lasting reality. There were several reasons that convinced the “National Chief” 
İsmet İnönü, then president of Turkey, to make this decision toward 
liberalization. First, even though Turkey had not participated in the Second World 
War, it kept a massive army mobilized throughout the war years for national 
security; this was a great economic burden to the state and required direct 
sacrifices from the peasantry. Prices increased four times during wartime, 
affecting the entire society. Top-down modernization attempts had created 
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discontents in the traditional segments of society, and since the Republican 
People’s Party governed the country without opposition, all anger was directed 
against the government and the ruling party. People needed a more democratic 
environment that would grant them space to express their thoughts and needs. 
The second reason was the changed dynamics of society. During wartime, a 
certain class of people had amassed wealth which now gave them influence in 
politics. This class was the “National Bourgeoisie” that had been the desired 
outcome of etatist policies. The bourgeoisie who were landowners or amassed 
wealth during the war were now demanding expanded rights since they did not 
trust the monoparty regime and were unhappy about the party’s intention to 
implement land reforms. The solution for the bourgeoisie was to create a political 
opposition against the ruling party. The third reason concerned the political 
situation after the War. Turkey wanted to prevent Soviet domination and the 
spread of communism. However, after the devastation of Germany, the Soviets 
had become the greatest power in the region and were pressuring Turkey by 
demanding territories from the eastern region of Turkey and a base near the 
Bosphorus in İstanbul. İnönü decided that Turkey alone could not stand against 
the Soviet Union, and thus he approached western powers, especially the United 
States. In order to join the western alliance, however, Turkey needed to apply the 
democratic norms of the West. Another factor that may be considered important 
is that the intention to create a multiparty system had existed ever since the 
Tanzimat era. During the lifetime of Atatürk, this had been attempted twice but 
failed both times because there was yet no political stability in the country. Thus, 
İnönü may have thought that if he could achieve the creation of a multiparty 
system, he would be a leader who succeeded where Atatürk had failed (Eroğul, 
1987, pp. 102-103). 
In a climate where certain changes had been implemented in the name of 
modernization and ordinary people had grown alienated from Kemalism, the 
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government’s economic policy led to inflation and increasing hardships for the 
population. This situation, coupled with the post-War trends toward political and 
economic liberalization throughout the world led Turkey to develop a multiparty 
system.  
For the reasons given, a new party was founded by the senior RPP members, 
Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü. The name of 
this new party was Democrat Party. The position of the newly founded party was 
an important question. During the Republican period, labor had been kept under 
control and the private sector had been hindered by bureaucratic regulations that 
had blocked its development. Even though the Democrats’ main concern was not 
specifically to gain the support of private sector, they wanted to remove the 
bureaucratic constraints on the private sector. The idea gained popularity that the 
Democrat Party (DP) was the party of business groups which had gained wealth 
during wartime. Adnan Menderes, one of the founders of the party, denied this 
claim and said that the party was not representative of people who had selfish 
interests but rather was of all people who wanted to put an end to the monoparty 
era (Ahmad, 1977, p. 16). Democrat party had won the elections and established 
government under the leadership of Adnan Menderes. 
The party program had two main principles: democracy and liberalism. 
Liberalism was taken as both economic liberalism and freedom of expression. 
The first thing given reference was freedom to establish trade unions and support 
for private entrepreneurs based on the principles of etatism mentioned in the 
constitution. The second principle, democracy, was announced as the main reason 
for the foundation of the party. The DP insisted on the institution of the principles 
of a secret ballot and open tabulation and the inclusion of party representatives in 
electoral commissions as conditions for realizing this goal. The party program 
stated that a new judicial system was required (Article 27) and that universities 
must have intellectual and administrative autonomy (Article 38). In the economic 
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domain, the main principle focused on private enterprise and increasing 
productivity, so that state enterprises could be privatized. Liberalization policies 
were implemented as a market principle, meaning that the state positioned itself 
as a passive actor in the marketplace (Article 51). One of the significant policies 
supported by the DP was agricultural development: the party program declared 
that the country’s development depended on agriculture, since 80% of the 
population was living in rural areas and worked in agriculture (Article 54) 
(Eroğul, 2013, p. 18). 
Zürcher has argued that the DP realized the importance of agriculture as a driver 
for modernization in a developing country like Turkey. In this regard, under the 
leadership of Menderes, they put the interests of the farmers first. This policy 
provided cheap credit to the farmers and regulated (supported) the prices of their 
products through a government agency, the TMO (Toprak Mahsülleri Ofisi).  
The Turkish economic program had been influenced by the American system. 
The government encouraged investment, especially foreign investment, and 
expected the participation of the bourgeoisie by investing in the industrial sector. 
However, despite the government’s encouragement, both foreign and Turkish 
investments remained low and the state’s investments were often short-sighted, 
aimed at rapid growth in the short term rather than long-term improvements in 
technology and industry (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 224-225). 
One of the most important issues in the DP era was the party’s discourse on 
religion. As can be seen from its economic policies, the party had adopted a 
populist approach. They were supported by a large segment of society who had 
grown tired of the RPP’s harsh policies on religion. During the multiparty era, 
competition led parties to reconsider their approach to religion. Since the RPP 
had embraced secularism as the hallmark of its westernization politics and in this 
way repressed Islam, they had to make concessions over religion to increase their 
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popularity while competing with the DP. In this situation, DP members chose to 
accuse Republicans of ignoring Islam and being hostile to it.  
The Democrats’ first measure was important at this point. They lifted the 
prohibition on the call to prayer (ezan) in Arabic once banned by the RPP 
government. This was symbolic for the majority of the society because they 
believed that call to prayers in Turkish was not fitting into the authenticity of 
religion. The following changes were the government actions to recognize 
religion in public spaces, such as compulsory religious lessons at school and 
lifting the ban on religious radio programs. It should be kept in mind that while 
performing these actions, Democrat leaders identified themselves as committed 
Kemalists just as the Republicans did. This portrait began to change after the 
worsening of the economy. Ahmad emphasizes that the peak year for the political 
exploitation of Islam in Turkey was 1958, which was also Turkey’s worst year 
economically. Attempts were made by the government to cover up the hardships 
and shortages of goods, and to remedy them through religious activities. It is a 
fact that during this period, religion was used as an instrument to increase votes 
and sustain support for the government. The second point worth emphasizing was 
the expectations of people who favored increasing religious activities and in this 
regard supported the government. These supporters of the DP were deeply 
opposed to RPP politics and the image that the RPP represented. In this regard, 
with the establishment of the DP, these opponents thought that they had found a 
political space within which to express themselves. Thus, Atatürk busts were 
vandalized in several regions of Turkey. These fanatical actions can be read as 
expressions of anger against RPP repression rather than direct hatred of Atatürk 
himself. At the DP congress in Konya, there were demands to restore the fez, the 
hijab and Arabic script. These demands were related to the outward form of 
Islam, instead of its essence. Contrary to late-nineteenth-century efforts to 
reconcile modernity and Islam, in the mid-twentieth-century secular Republic of 
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Turkey, there were fundamentalist, reactionary tendencies partly as a reaction to 
the oppressive policies of secular RPP governments.  
 
3.5 The Era of the Justice Party 
	  
After the 1960 coup, a new party was needed to fill the gap left by the Democrat 
Party and inherit its 5 million votes. The NUC (National Unity Committee) 
established after the coup was aware of this situation and, rather than forming a 
new party of its own, it decided to support the newly-founded New Turkey Party 
(NTP) of a former DP dissident, Ekrem Alican. This party represented the elitist, 
intellectual, and urban segment of society. According to Feroz Ahmad, the NTP 
failed to assume the legacy of the DP largely because of its narrow elitist base, 
and because its loyal DP supporters disapproved of the party founders, since they 
had been expelled from the DP and joined the RPP (Ahmad, 1977, p. 233). 
The other alternative was the Justice Party (JP), founded by former general Ragıp 
Gümüşpala. As a former military man, Gümüşpala enjoyed the confidence of the 
armed forces; he was also able to gain the support of DP voters by giving 
positions in his organization to former DP members. Indeed, these were the key 
to reaching a wide base in a short time, as the JP reorganized the defunct DP 
branches at provincial and local levels (Ahmad, 1977, p. 234). 
Two facts must be emphasized about the political tendencies of Turkish society in 
this era. The first is the favoring of religious, central rightist politicians. Since 
Democrat Party members had played this role in the past, voters supported the 
direct successors of the DP. The second point involved the representation of the 
rural population; intellectual, elitist coalitions were not favored in this regard.  
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The best-known leader identified with the Justice Party was Süleyman Demirel, 
whose modest background inspired popular support. Demirel came from a rural 
part of the country and had been born into a lower-middle-class family in 
southern Anatolia. He had been able to achieve some upward mobility through 
education: an engineer by profession, he had worked at several different 
companies. Nevertheless, voters from the countryside perceived him as one of 
them and this gave him a distinct electoral advantage. Demirel emphasized the 
Islamic character of his party and their respect for traditional values, while 
fighting against the communist threat and domestic leftist inclinations. He was a 
technocrat with plans to industrialize the country. He supported the idea of direct 
participation by capitalism in politics and also gained the support of big business 
owners. As a supporter of capitalism, Demirel emphasized the difference between 
nineteenth-century profiteering capitalism and his own party’s program. 
However, development plans through foreign aid and private investment was not 
a new idea. The same policy had been pursued by the DP and had not yielded the 
expected results (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 240-242). 
As the leader of the JP after Gümüşpala’s untimely death, Demirel was faced with 
the need to maintain a balance between the different factions comprising the 
party, such as officers, former DP supporters, secularist intellectuals, and 
businessmen. He gradually lost the support of many of these factions. Big 
business withdrew its suppport because of his economic policies; former DP 
members withdrew theirs after he failed to take action to restore their political 
rights. Demirel also partly lost the support of the conservative wing of his party, 
small traders and landowners, after proposing a new system of taxation intended 
to secure funds for his industrialization program (Zürcher, 2004, p. 252). 
After Demirel’s resignation from an active political role following the 1980 
military coup, a member of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
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accused him of having turned Turkey into an open market for Europe and the 
United States.  
Among the politicians that gained significance after Süleyman Demirel’s 
departure from active politics, Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan deserve 
special mention as coming from conservative backgrounds and having received 
an engineering education. Although Özal became Prime Minister before Erbakan, 
I will discuss Erbakan first, as he was politically active long before Özal.  
 
3.6 Necmettin Erbakan 
	  
In his autobiography, Erbakan told the story of his venture to the presidency of 
the Chamber of Commerce. He said while they –professionals in mechanical 
engineering- were struggling to manufacture engines for civil life, the Turkish 
government was importing busses, airplanes, and trucks with aid coming from the 
Marshall Fund. However, he wrote, it was possible to manufacture those vehicles 
in Turkey. Improvements in industry were being prevented because there were 
circles that had a vested interest in the continuation of importation. The Chamber 
of Commerce was tasked with distributing investment credits at the time. Almost 
all the credits were given to major import companies, while a small amount was 
sent to Anatolian entrepreneurs. For this reason, Anatolian entrepreneurs were 
facing difficulties in making investments. In order to protect the rights of 
Anatolian entrepreneurs, Erbakan sought and won the presidency of the industry 
branch of the Chamber in 1966, after which he became Secretary General of the 
Chamber. In his own words, he attempted to shift the credit market to Anatolia, a 
policy that disturbed those who had been benefiting from the major part of those 
credits. However, he was supported by the Anatolian investors and with that 
support, Erbakan became the president of The Union of Chambers and 
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Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). The government and certain factions 
of capital blocked his efforts, and the right to distribute credits were taken from 
the authority of the Chamber and given to the Ministry of Industry. At this point, 
to continue his mission, he chose to enter politics (Erbakan, 2014, p. 10-11). 
Erbakan’s philosophy and politics can be discussed under three main topics: 
Islamic union, technology and industry, and the “Just [Socio-Economic] Order”. 
He defines his movement with Islamic culture and a scientific background and 
based on these, he worked for establishing an adapted version of this Islamic 
based order to the modern world. Erbakan’s politics differed from that of his 
predecessors. Other parties targeting the religious segments of society supported 
liberal economics and capitalism; Erbakan’s “Just Order” was an example of 
etatist politics adapted to Islamic doctrine.  
Industrial development was one of the main issues taken up by Erbakan. In his 
speeches, he declared that industry was essential for creating job opportunities for 
the increasing population. He used examples from Islamic and Ottoman history as 
supporting arguments. He said that without industry, no country could be strong. 
In order to be one of the strongest countries of the world, Turkey needed to 
industrialize (Erbakan, 2014, p. 187). Erbakan was comparing the histories of the 
West and the East from the viewpoint of technological development, and 
claiming that Turkey could develop a high level of technology, just as the 
Ottoman Empire had once done.  
Erbakan problematized Turkey’s industrial development in four respects. First, 
the mentality of importing instead of manufacturing had to be changed in order to 
encourage investment in industry and develop manufacturing technologies. One 
of Erbakan’s mottos was: “Genuine industrialization is to have factories that 
manufacture factories” (Erbakan, 2014, p. 192). Second, Erbakan criticized 
Turkey’s “lack of planning.” For efficient industrial investment, the location of 
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the facilities needed to be taken into account in light of transportation, 
geographical, and manpower factors. In Turkey, however, these factors were not 
considered while investing in industry, and planning was neglected. Besides, 
when building facilities, technical support and engineering services were supplied 
by foreign companies. Domestic sources for technical support and Turkish 
engineers were not involved. Erbakan believed that Turkish engineers had the 
potential to produce engines, and to prove his claim, he founded an engine 
factory, “Gümüş Motor,” in order to lead the country to stop importing engines 
by improving the technological substructure and developing an engine industry 
(Erbakan, 1974, p. 97). 
For Erbakan, one of the most important and strategic industries in any country 
was the defense industry. However, he said, although there had been attempts to 
develop a defense industry during the Second World War, those attempts had 
remained stunted and now Turkey depended on foreign countries to defend itself. 
Since Turkey was a developing country, Erbakan was aware of the limits of the 
research budgets and technological development potential that were available. He 
suggested realistic technological development alternatives that Turkey could 
produce as a first step. In his speeches, Erbakan emphasized the necessity of 
technology and industry while presenting his solutions for redressing the 
shortcomings in those areas; in so doing, he stressed his identity as a trained 
engineer to gain the confidence of his audience.  
As a professor who had studied the natural sciences, Erbakan had certain specific 
views concerning the knowledge of western scientists. In his speeches, he 
affirmed that most of those who had not properly studied science and only had 
limited knowledge of it thought that the West had an unquestionable superiority 
over the East in this domain. Erbakan rejected this view and, based on his own 
academic studies at the doctoral level, claimed that the West did not have a 
deeper understanding of the experimental results that they had obtained, and that 
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they created their scientific arguments based on suppositions. In order to prove 
his claim, Erbakan referred to history. Muslims had benefited from the works of 
ancient Greece, Egypt, and India, and while doing so, they had used systematic 
thinking. They did not take as given the information they read, but instead 
experimented and improved on it. In Islamic scientific history, the sciences were 
improved based on references, experiments, and collaboration. In the West, 
Europeans took the works of Muslim scholars and translated them, although 
while translating, proper scientific terms could not be found because of the 
backwardness of the sciences in comparison with the East. For this reason, it was 
only in the eighteenth century that Europeans had begun to understand the works 
they had translated back in the fourteenth century (Erbakan, 1974, pp. 24-26). 
Erbakan identified himself as an expert in technical sciences, and he constructed 
an argument about Enlightenment philosophy and the development of the natural 
sciences in the West and in Islamic history. He argued that western philosophy 
had developed through the reciprocal denial of the philosophers and the scientists. 
On the other hand, in Islamic history, scientists and philosophers improved and 
enhanced their predecessors’ works, a tradition known as sharh in Islamic 
culture. By using this argument, Erbakan pointed out that the Western scientists’ 
eyes were closed and that they did not know which way to follow. The only way 
to overcome this obstacle was to follow the science of the Quran (Erbakan, 1974, 
pp. 44-45). 
Erbakan is one of the most important among Turkish politicians who identified 
themselves as both religious Muslims and engineers. He formed his perspective in 
light of the Quran and examined the sciences from this perspective. As a 
professor of mechanical engineering, he used his knowledge to create alternative 
plans for the industrialization of Turkey; likewise, he benefited from his religious 
background to formulate his social agenda. Erbakan’s philosophy reached a wide 
range of people throughout his political career. In his talks as a politician, 
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Erbakan motivated his audiences by giving examples from Islamic and 
specifically Ottoman history. For him, contrary to popular opinion, Ottomans had 
been leading technological inventions and improvements, and the West had 
benefited from and been inspired by the inventions of Islamic scholars. In this 
respect, he held that it was possible to improve technology and industrialize while 
also preserving Islamic values instead of embracing Western values fed by 
Enlightenment ideas. 
The monoparty era in Turkey’s political history reflects the nuances of the 
modernization program formed by the followers of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and 
executed directly by the hands of the state. Contrary to the quest of Ottoman 
scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in terms of 
reconciling Islam and modernity, starting with the establishment of the Republic 
and the formation of the government under the influence of Kemalist doctrine, 
Islam was removed from the equation and modernity itself became the main goal. 
The RPP’s party program adopted secularism as a central principle, and the main 
motivation behind the new regulations promulgated by the government in 
education, the law, and the use of public spaces. Given popular values and 
practices in Turkey, it can be seen that secular policies were exterior to and top-
down for society. In this regard, politicians who saw the tendencies and desires of 
society formed their party program and discourse based on society’s expectations, 
bound to religious and traditional values and defined as conservative.  
For Turkey as a developing country, another keyword besides secularism was 
industrialization as part of the parties’ modernization agenda. The RPP’s statist 
strategies to develop industry with the help of the state, and the DP’s liberal 
economic strategy of reinforcement of foreign investment and promotion of free 
enterprise both pointed toward the mission of industrialization. In this period, 
industrial investments were highly appreciated; engineers took their place on the 
stage as the most competent technical experts and the carriers of technology. 
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Particularly after 1965, within the framework of the state’s industrialization 
policy, investment in technical education as well as the number of engineers 
increased. Engineers became indispensable socio-professional actors. As an 
engineer-politician, Erbakan emphasized his education and profession in his 
public speeches and thus sought to prove his abilities and vision to lead 
technological investments and establish heavy industry.  
 
3.7 Turgut Özal 
	  
After the 1980 military coup, following the return to civilian rule, a new 
government was formed under the leadership of Turgut Özal who first served as 
Prime Minister and then as President. Özal is well remembered for his 
economically liberal discourse as well as his conservative worldview. Having 
been educated as an electrical engineer and worked in this capacity for both state 
institutions and private companies, he then studied economics and became 
involved with active politics in the 1980s.  
Contrary to the traditional Turkish view of the “sacredness of the state,” Özal 
considered the state as no more than an instrument. His politics were based on the 
idea that the state was there to serve society and not the other way around. In 
support of democracy, he stressed the “superiority of the elected against the 
appointed” (Erdoğan, 2001, p. 18-19). In this section, I will highlight his 
economically liberal, yet socially conservative character and his interest in 
technology, in order to draw a portrait of his era. 
Born to a mother who was a teacher and a father who was a bank official, Turgut 
Özal spent his childhood in different cities in Anatolia. It may be for this reason 
that he was careful about closing the gaps between state and society. Erdoğan 
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suggests that his adoption of liberal thinking had also been facilitated by this 
factor, which had led him to reject any alienation from society’s common values. 
Moderate conservative people tend to support development projects if they do not 
run counter to their beliefs. Özal benefited from this fact and gained the support 
of moderate conservatives to execute his reform program (Erdoğan, 2001, p. 24). 
Beyond being a populist, however, Özal’s intention was to gain the support of 
different factions. For this, he emphasised freedom of speech, freedom of religion 
and conscience, and freedom of investment (Yazıcıoğlu, 2001, p. 202). Özal also 
took Ottoman pluralism as a model to end ethnic conflicts. Within this program, 
he gave Kurds the right to speak their languages in public and celebrate their 
traditional festival (Nawroz). Beyond this, his ultimate intention was to convert 
Turkey into an open and pluralistic society, eliminating military tutelage and the 
bureaucracy (Aral, 2001, p. 244). His religious personality and non-military 
background increased his popularity during his presidency. As an economically 
liberal and religious person, he aimed to ignite an Islamic Renaissance by 
combining modern science and knowledge with religious tolerance (Aral, 2001, 
p. 226). 
Besides having close political interactions with the United States and with some 
European countries, Özal gave importance to commerce in his liberal economic 
program. His motto was “Catching up with the modern and economically 
developed world.” On technological issues, Özal coded the Kemalist aim of 
modernity as technology in all parts of everydat life. While he encouraged 
technological development, he did not impose wholesale westernization of 
lifestyles (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 153). Overall, in Özal’s discourse, Turkish society 
found liberal thinking, a market economy, pluralism as an ideology, close 
political and commercial relations with the Turkic states of Central Asia, and an 
attempt at unity them after the end of the Cold War. Özal’s conservatism 
provided a space for religious people to live in accordance with their beliefs. On 
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the other hand, he also aimed to provide space for people from all parts of society 
as part of his liberal approach. 
 
3.8 Interpretation of Conservatism in Turkey and Conservative Engineers 
	  
İsmail Kara has defined Islamism as an activist movement that appeared during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and aimed to make Islam dominant over 
every part of life (faith, religious practices, ethics, philosophy, politics, the law, 
and education) by using a rational method to eliminate the dangers of western 
colonization, oppressive rulers, and popular superstitions, thus civilizing Islamic 
society (Kara, 1987, p. 28). According to this definition, Islamic scholars were 
represented as reformers of religion with a modernist approach. For example, 
Muhammad Abduh, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and Mehmed Akif Ersoy were 
followers of Islamist ideology.  
As İsmail Kara points out, “conservatism” in the Turkish context is associated 
with religiosity. A conservative person implies one who is religious, a practicing 
Muslim who lives according to Islamic guidance. In a deeper sense, Berat Özipek 
has described conservatism as based on three dimensions: reason, society, and 
politics. The epistemological basis of conservatism was the Enlightenment’s 
interpretation of reason. Ontologically, human beings have a limited capacity that 
is not sufficient to perceive the system of the entire universe and humanity. 
Socially, the limited perception and limited reason of a human being cannot 
construct social rules independently of religion, tradition, and experience. Finally, 
since reason has no basis to explore the rules of society and create an idealized 
world, a rationalist project to transform the existing order is not approved of by 
conservatism (Özipek, 2011, pp. 25-26). 
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Regarding this historical background and the dynamics valued by society, 
engineering as a profession can be questioned in light of politics, religious values, 
and the mission of modernization. In this study, we have dealt with respondents 
who identify themselves as engineers and as being conservative. The meaning of 
conservatism can be tricky and is often confused with Islamism. The engineers 
we have dealt with for this study saw themselves as simply religious people who 
embraced religious values to form their philosophy of life, rather than as activists 
with a mission of reinterpreting sources and using politics as an instrument in a 
project intended to create a new form of piety and a new kind of Muslim 
individual.  
One of the main dualities of the history of secularism and religion in the Republic 
of Turkey can be examined by investigating the characteristics and preferences of 
engineers who identify themselves as conservative, since they use a rational 
approach in their profession and regard other tendencies as irrational. From the 
perspective of conservative engineers, does engineering have motivations beyond 
providing a profession, and in which areas they feel themselves as competent can 
give clues about their role in society? As one of the key players in the state’s 
principal agenda, industrialization, do they see themselves as being close to 
politics? The most important question is whether or not conservative engineers in 
the Republic of Turkey have actually realized the goal of late-nineteenth-century 
Islamic-Ottoman thinkers by approaching faith with a rational methodology and 
moving beyond the burden of superstitions and traditions for scientific progress 
and development.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 Conservative Engineers of Turkey - Interviews 
 
 
Those who deal with biology and medicine are condemned to the 
laws of nature. Jurists are helpless before man-made laws. Those 
who work with mathematics are never free of fancy. For this reason, 
it is not appropriate for us to involve ourselves too much with these 
matters. In those who work with geometry, there is no place for 
fancy, geometry makes one conservative. Therefore we must be 
particularly involved with geometers (mühendis/engineers). 
                                                          Shaykh Abdü’l-Azîz Efendi6 
 
This chapter includes parts of in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 with 
engineers who define themselves as conservative. The respondents were selected 
from various industries as well as academia. They are desribed in Table 4.1, 
where their names are withheld to protect their privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Taken from the book “Şeyh Efendi’nin Rüyası” written by İsmail Kara (2002, p. 41). The quotation was 
translated from the Turkish by İrvin Cemil Schick. 
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Table 4.1 :  List of informants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Identities of the Republic of Turkey 
	  
The Republic of Turkey was founded on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in 
Anatolia in 1923. Between carrying the heritage of a rich Ottoman-Islamic culture 
and the desire for founding a new country adapted to the world system, which 
meant European standards, the elites of society who had been educated in Europe 
(or at least educated in Turkey in the European style) were inclined to deny the 
Ottoman cultural heritage and create a new, modern identity. In this regard, these 
elites, as representatives of the Kemalist modernization project, constructed a new 
Turkish identity based on the characteristics of the West, which were fed by 
Name	   Sex	   Age	   Date	  of	  Interview	  A	   Male	   48	   3/8/	  2012	  E	   Male	   32	   5/29/	  2012	  K	   Male	   30	   7/15/2012	  C	   Female	   37	   5/14/2012	  S	   Male	   31	   3/7/2012	  M	   Female	   32	   5/6/2012	  F	   Male	   42	   5/6/2012	  J	   Male	   55	   5/23/2012	  O	   Male	   59	   6/1/2012	  Z	   Male	   62	   5/14/2012	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trends in European history: feudalism, humanism, the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment philosophy of the eighteenth century, secularism, liberal-
parliamentarian democracy, and the industrial revolution. 
From the beginning of the sixteenth century, following the discovery of the 
American continent and the colonization of the Indian coasts, Europeans from 
Portugal, Spain, England, France, and Italy began to accumulate enormous 
wealth. While Portugal and Spain were not able to elaborate a system to augment 
their wealth, England found ways to turn its wealth into capital. The creation of a 
new economic system led to remarkable changes in the structure of society. A 
new class emerged and overshadowed the nobles and the clergy. This new urban 
middle class controlled the trade of money, soon shaping the perception of 
society and shifting from a religious to a profane worldview. Besides, immense 
trade flows created a workload beyond the limits of existing human resources. 
The lack of balance between workload and human resources opened up new 
horizons and led to technological developments thanks to the scientific 
knowledge transferred in the thirteenth century from Islamic scholars. With these 
new horizons, a new worldview was raised on the shoulders of merchants and 
engineers involving basic concern with the material world instead of wisdom 
(Duralı, 2000, pp. 80-81). 
The rise of engineering was not due to the same motivation in the Ottoman world. 
Cartesian thought spread across the Ottoman intelligentsia, starting from the 
Balkans and then gaining popularity in Ottoman bureaucratic circles. Especially 
after the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699, supporters of reforms led the turn westward 
with the aim of developing the Ottoman Empire. Because of the resistance of 
religious scholars (ulama) and traditionalists, the first westernizing bureaucrats 
were only able to reform the most emergent field, which was military technology. 
To convince the ulama, the Islamic principle stating that “For the sake of 
protecting the state, imitating the enemy’s tactics is permissible” was used and 
	  	   76 
the first schools of engineering were established to develop military technology in 
the eighteenth century (İnalcık, 1998, pp. 23-24). 
In her doctoral thesis, Nilüfer Göle emphasized the correlation between the 
actions of ruling elites and those of social actors within the society. During the 
early Republican era, the major characteristic of politics was “democratic 
nationalism”. Analysis of this characteristic reveals the contradictions between 
secular state policies and the religious public. For the sake of establishing a 
modern country, the state aimed to spread the modernist values of “secularism” 
and “democratic consent”. Since society’s religious inclinations ran counter to 
secularism, the hands of the state upheld nationalism to keep the society in unity. 
With the motivation of nationalist thought and etatist policies, engineers appeared 
on the stage as the bearers of the industrial development of the country and took 
control of the production processes of the state’s industrial enterprises. In this 
manner, engineers carried the mission of spreading rational, scientific values and 
became the main pillar of the national economy. After 1950, the role of engineers 
changed with the shift from etatism to liberalism. While continuing to run 
industrial enterprises, their influence as some of the principal agents of the 
national economy vanished and engineers began to incline toward the private 
sector. Engineering education became popular after 1965, in view of the emphasis 
placed on industrial development, as well as the encouragement to follow 
technological developments and scientific methods in industry, and thus the 
number of engineers in Turkey increased (Göle, 1998, pp. 105-115). 
Engineers were once the flag bearers of industrialism and indirectly of a 
materialist worldview in the West. In the Republic of Turkey, which had been 
founded on the values and principles of modern Europe, the same pattern could 
not be followed since the cultural and traditional background of society was 
different. Instead of applying exactly the same pattern, a modification was 
implemented and nationalism was promoted. Thus, in modernizing Turkey, 
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engineers were ideologically posed to serve their country. As Göle has 
emphasized, they were in charge of industrial enterprises and, instead of being 
pure technocrats, they were led by nationalism to be the bearers of 
developmentalist ideology in Turkey. 
Another point that must be emphasized is the relatively permeable class 
boundaries of Turkey at the time, particularly for people coming from the rural 
areas of Turkey which accounted for almost 80% of the population in the 1950s. 
As in the example of Süleyman Demirel, education provided the means for social 
betterment and engineering in particular was a significant channel of upward 
social mobility. Mr. A’s response to the question “What was the motivation of 
religious people for choosing engineering as their profession?” supports this 
hypothesis: 
I think religious people in Turkey mostly belong to the lower-
income segment of society, and these people believe that to obtain a 
higher income, one should be a doctor, an engineer, or a lawyer. 
They relate money to mechanical jobs rather than art or the social 
sciences (Mr. A, age 48).	  	  
In a similar vein, another informant expressed the social position of conservative 
people as oppressed and limited until recent years.   
Especially in recent years, after the spread of preparatory courses for 
university entrance examinations, the workload of students increased 
and their social interests remained weak. Most of the religious 
people already have socializing problems. I believe that religious 
people were repressed and thus they limited their social space. 
Instead of expressing themselves socially, they remained antisocial 
and under this influence, their children tend to choose science 
departments. For them, a good engineering department was the best 
way to prove themselves. However, I believe that this environment 
will begin to change soon. Now religious people recognize their 
shortcomings and focus on raising children with social qualifications 
as well (Mr. E, age 32).	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Mr E.’s response suggests that conservative people do not belong to the elite 
classes of society. On the contrary, in the portrait he draws, conservative people 
are insecure and reserved. For this reason, they tend to choose an influential job 
as a professional career, and in their eyes, these jobs are not in the social sciences 
or art departments.  
Not all the responses emphasized economic concerns and financial security. A 
young informant with an imam-hatip school background, which are the schools 
giving religious education besides the regular curricula and functions as a 
vocational schools to train imams as well, emphasized the mission they carried as 
a conservative generation. Mr. K stated: 
Most of my friends chose to be engineers. We were going to imam-
hatip schools and in those days the university entrance exam scores 
of imam-hatip graduates were automatically reduced. They 
motivated us to take government positions in the future, so we left 
imam-hatip schools and then we chose engineering (Mr K. age 30).	  
Another response opened up a new perspective on understanding the correlation 
between modernization and rational thinking. One of the main ideas of 
Enlightenment philosophy was that advances in science would liberate the mind 
from religion and traditional authority. However, Mr. Z said: 
I believe that people who choose engineering incline to religion 
rather than the other way around, because there was a religious 
scholar named Said-i Nursi in Turkey. He wrote addressing the 
interest of people who had a background in the physical sciences 
instead of theology or law (Mr. Z, age 62). 
Regarding Mr. Z’s response, a different approach to modernization is possible 
regarding the cultural background and intellectual heritage of a society. As a 
person born into a family that defines itself as Muslim but is not totally observant, 
Mr. Z studied sciences and at the same time constructed his own religious identity 
by reading the works of Turkish religious intellectual, Said Nursi. As a matter of 
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fact, Fuad Pasha, an Ottoman statesman in 19th century, pointed out the same 
relation, using the physical sciences to have a deeper understanding in religious 
norms, in a speech delivered at the University of İstanbul (Darülfünûn) in January 
1863. He classified modern physics and divine hikmah within the same category, 
or, by another interpretation, he defined modern physics as an instrument for 
divine hikmah and argued that there was continuity between ancient physics 
(hikmah) and modern physics (Kara, 2014, pp. 122-123). 
Regarding the Mr. Z’s respond on forming a world perception based on studying 
physical sciences and reading Islamic works and Fuat Pasha’s speech to see the 
relation between modern sciences and divine hikmah, I would suggest having 
recourse to the term “alternative modes of modernity” since these people create 
their own identity through reinterpretations of the form imported from the West 
and lying outside local traditions. As Göle stated, “In order to arrive at new 
prisms of analysis, we need to further de-center the West itself and look at what 
once were considered peripheries as centers in their own right, with their own 
capacity for creating history” (Göle, 2002). 
 
4.2 The Borders of Engineering 
	  
In the eyes of conservative engineers, the areas in which engineers work 
effectively in Turkey’s modernization process is a debatable issue. Some of the 
interviewees claimed that engineers’ abilities basically cover industrial subjects 
and should remain in this area, while others thought that engineers have the 
capability to solve problems and analytical thinking makes them practical 
problem solvers for a wide range of issues.  
I think engineers should not be involved in politics, and an engineer 
should not be promoted to a manager position until the age of 40. 
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Involvement in politics or being eager to get promoted before 
gaining seniority are equally inappropriate for engineers (Mr. Z age 
62). 
Mr. S supported Mr. Z’s argument, saying: 
In Turkey engineers work in almost all fields and they work with 
good performance. However, for me, the profession of engineers is 
technical and must be concerned with the lowest level of the 
hierarchy: the technical workforce. At the top level, there must be 
social scientists that are more able to manage people. But we 
engineers are not convinced about this order because managers are 
paid more than a regular engineer. Engineers believe that they had 
better scores to enter university, and they are well educated, so in 
this case why would they earn less? All in all, economic concerns 
lead them to be in higher positions (Mr. S, age 31). 
Why would engineers believe that they are competent in almost all fields? Is this 
self-assurance fed by society’s opinion? The answer is related to Mr. F’s and Mrs. 
M’s thoughts. Mrs. M said: 
Engineers are present in all fields. I don’t think that it is directly 
related to being an engineer; however, in a certain era in Turkey, 
students with a high level of perception were guided to choose 
engineering departments. Under this choice, their inclinations are 
different. They gain multiple identities and since they have high 
perception they become successful in their areas (Mrs. M, age 32). 
When asked why individuals chose to study engineering and then sought 
employment in other fields, Mrs. M defined engineering as a guaranteed way to 
earn a living, like being a medical doctor. Economic concerns were emphasized 
in the choice of engineering. Mr. F also believed that science departments were 
once very popular and students chose them without questioning. He said: 
Turkey is an exceptional case. Brilliant students prefer the science 
department in high school and then mostly enter engineering 
departments or medical schools. I was doing better in social sciences 
but I followed the mainstream and entered a science-based high 
school, because this is what successful students do (Mr. F, age 42). 
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We see that although Mr. F was doing better in social sciences, he entered an 
engineering department under the influence of mainstream pressures. Likewise, 
Mr. E stated that he would have preferred a social science department; however, 
under the influence of his family’s expectations, he chose an engineering 
education. Regarding the engineer profile that Turkey needs, both Mr. F and Mr. 
E believed that Turkey needs engineers interested in social affairs.  
Turkey needs engineers who question themselves every day to create 
value for their country and for their companies. We need both 
engineer teams occupied with technical work, machines, and tools 
like a regular worker in the field, and engineers with management 
abilities. Also I believe that engineers are needed in politics. Some 
rumors say that engineers could not govern the country but we also 
had governments led by economists, such as [Tansu] Çiller. Those 
governments were not better than the governments set up by 
engineers (Mr. E, age 32). 
By focusing on the abilities obtained through an engineering education, Mr. A. 
was favorable to the idea of getting involved in politics: “I believe that engineers 
are more suitable for politics, because engineers are educated to solve problems. 
They are focused and have an analytical thinking background that makes them 
good problem solvers” (Mr. A, age 48). In contrast, Mrs. C’s argument focused 
on leadership: “Engineers are not educated to be leaders; they should focus on 
improving technology and do scientific studies. This is the duty of engineers on 
the road to modernization” (Mrs. C, age 37).	  
Beyond being conservative, certain conclusions can be drawn from these 
arguments about being an engineer and what engineers were qualified to do. 
Whether or not the informants thought that engineers should only be occupied 
with technical work, they all believed that they had the capacity to go beyond 
that. They exhibited self-confidence and self-perception, and, relatedly, they felt 
competent to enter almost any field of endeavor, relying on their intelligence and 
education. When providing examples to prove this point, they mentioned Oğuz 
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Atay in literature; Erbakan, Demirel, and Özal in politics; a number of social 
scientists with engineering backgrounds; and various entrepreneurs. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Erbakan used his own training as an engineer to convince 
his constituents in his speeches on industrialization and development.  
According to the informants’ responses, a prized characteristic in the conservative 
world is a guaranteed job. This refers to professions in which it is more likely to 
find employment, and are thus more appreciated by society. Based on the 
responses of the informants, in Turkey, these professions are law, medicine, and 
engineering. There are basically two reasons for choosing engineering. The first 
is being curious about technical instruments and having a strong quantitative 
ability, and the second is mainstream social pressure expressed as the tendency 
for smart students to choose science-based high schools or science departments in 
ordinary high schools. Consequently, not all engineers in Turkey have strong 
quantitative intelligence; there are also engineers with stronger qualitative 
intelligence, who chose to receive an engineering education for other reasons. 
One of my informants, Mr. F, argued that this is a good thing: 
I think Turkey needs engineers with strong social analysis abilities. I 
mean engineers who can combine technical knowledge with the 
social sciences. In Turkey there is no ideal professional business 
environment, no professionalism. If you prefer to be a professional 
in a specific area, you would most probably be unemployed after 
some time. You should be able to work in different areas, which 
gives you flexibility to work in different departments and fields. 
This is ideal in Turkey’s conditions (Mr. F, age 42). 
In this regard, engineers could be defined as the key players in Turkey’s industry 
and business environments. Most of the informants did not identify themselves 
only with technology and industry, defining themselves as omnipotent players in 
all fields.  
 
	  	   83 
	  
4.3 Method and Initiative 
	  
According to Weber, the modern bureaucracy limits the space in which people 
can use their perceptions. Actions are under the control of a system designed for 
specific institutions; thus, under the control of a bureaucratic structure, morality 
and initiative are not necessarily required, compared to decisions taken by 
applying other methods.  
I asked my informants whether initiative or methodology was more efficient in 
their decision-making processes. Mrs. M said:  
Initiative. That is because in our system, method has not taken its 
place yet. The reason is that we are about to reach maturity and 
begin to make innovations. It is hard for us to use existing 
methodologies while trying to catch new ones. On the other hand we 
are trying to make a profit (Mrs. M, age 32). 
My informants believed that methodology was the less risky path to decision-
making. However, beyond the strict limits of a method, they experienced or 
believed that initiative could open a gate to solving the problems on which they 
worked. Mr. K, Mr. J, and Mrs. C’s responses were as follows: 
I believe that we should act within a rational methodology, but in 
Turkey, it’s not the way you should act. You have to take initiative. 
Besides, it’s a good thing that makes you liked by your employees. 
The handicap here is that if you are taking initiative on an issue you 
hardly know about, that is dangerous. Methods are the safest way 
(Mr. K, age 30). 
I use rational methods more than personal initiative. However, 
experience has taught me that there is always a way out even if 
methods tell you the opposite. Initiative opens a space for you (Mr. 
J, age 55). 
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I always use reason. I take initiative only for minor issues, but 
rationality for me is not apart from emotions. For this reason, I’m 
trying to find a balance between rational thinking and my emotions 
(Mrs. C, age 37). 
Mr. F’s response represented the unbalanced bureaucratization-subjective 
decision level of industry in Turkey. He said “The lack of professionalism in 
Turkey opens a larger space for the use of initiative than would normally be the 
case” (Mr. F, age 42). In this instance, we might also question if Turkish 
engineers are professional modern elements of industrial development, or if 
bureaucratization is the indispensable crucial notion of modernity. 
 
4.4 The Privatization of Religion 
	  
According to Weber, an increase of scientific knowledge and higher levels of 
education in industrial societies will bring about a trend toward a rational 
worldview. Within this framework, the most rational people in any given society 
must be the most highly educated and have the greatest scientific knowledge. 
Secularism as one of the main elements of modernity implies that the tendency to 
drive religion out of politics, economics, science, and the public sphere and push 
it into the private sphere is an inevitable result of modernity and the discrediting 
of religious institutions and norms in society (Casanova, 1994, p. 13). 
Keyder has pointed to a certain reductionist behavior behind the problem of 
secularism in Turkey. He noted that in Turkey, religious identity is only 
associated with politics, while in daily life, from a sociological perspective, the 
multi-dimensional relation of religious identity with modernity is ignored. He 
said that the main debate revolves around the duality of “secular-modern identity” 
and “religious-antimodernist identity,” and argued that beyond this assumption, 
there is a more complex and fragile relationship between religion and modernity 
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than is suggested by secularization theory. Keyder borrowed Peter Berger’s terms 
“objective secularization” and “subjective secularization” to describe this 
complex and fragile relation (Keyder, 2003, pp. 118-119). 
Objective secularization refers to the separation of religious affairs and state 
affairs, and to the decline of the influence of religious institutions in the public 
sphere. Objective secularization is associated with a social-structural process 
engaged to the nation state as the main dynamic of society. In this way, the 
nation-state’s legitimacy is isolated from a religious character. Subjective 
secularization, on the other hand, refers to the secularization of the individuals’ 
consciousness. An individual’s free-minded, modern isolation from traditional-
religious references leads him to engage himself with nature, social relations, and 
his personal life within the terms of a secular mindset. Put differently, the cultural 
formation of the modern self is the main article of subjective secularization 
(Berger, 1967, p. 127). 
Keyder noted that the relation between modernity and secularization is not linear 
and causal, as is commonly assumed. In the Turkish example, the mission of 
objective secularization succeeded and was embraced by society. On the other 
hand, when it came to subjective secularization, Turkish society reacted against it, 
countering the danger of discrediting religion through its privatization. This 
reaction led to an opposite current and religion remained one of the main pillars 
of society. Moreover, this situation caused a sacralizing process within society. 
As an example, in business, organizations such as the Independent Industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSIAD) created a network of religious 
business owners and created opportunities to establish business organizations. 
(Keyder, 2003) This example is related to Weber’s article “The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism”, in which he described the creation of trust between 
businessmen who were members of particular Protestant denominations.  
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An informant’s response to my question as to whether or not there is a difference 
between conservative engineers and others supports this argument. Mr. E. said 
that conservative engineers have closer relations with business owners in 
Anatolia. His observations on the conservative engineers in his own organization 
may refer to the causal relationship between cosmopolitanism and modernity. In 
his statement, Mr. E used the toponym “Anatolia” to describe the less 
cosmopolitan, rural parts of Turkey, indirectly referring to them as more 
conservative. His emphasis on the close relationship between conservative 
engineers and Anatolian business owners is similar to the discourse related to 
both parties’ conservatism.  
On the other hand, Mr. E’s attitude toward business life is fully professional and 
separate from his beliefs and private life. As mentioned above, Keyder stated that 
Turkish society reacted against subjective secularism out of fear of discrediting 
religion and privatizing their beliefs. Contrary to this observation, some of the 
informants stressed the separation between their beliefs, conservative worldview, 
and professional personae. In light of these statements, we can hypothesize that 
Turkish conservative engineers are generally open to subjective secularism. Mr. E 
said: 
There is a statement that the ancients used, “mukteza-i hale 
mutabakat,” which means to adapt to an existing situation. I adapt to 
environments if they do not directly and negatively affect my 
personality and beliefs. I know the profile of Turkish people and 
organizations, so I try to work in harmony with everyone. My 
motivation is: ‘My position is not only for my own benefit. I might 
not get a promotion, but in consequence, conservative believers must 
be successful. Success is not for a person’s career, but for being a 
good example.’ In order to achieve this, I must adapt to different 
environments and I should be balanced. Non-conservative 
colleagues know me and do not question me, and they know that we 
can be good friends, work together, and share the same social 
environments (Mr. E, age 32). 
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In the same vein, Mr. K emphasized the fact that he keeps his beliefs out of 
his professional life, saying: “I do not stress my conservative identity to my 
seniors; my conservative identity becomes visible only when I ask for 
permission to go Juma [Friday] prayers” (Mr. K, age 30). 
Concerning innovation and engineering, Mr. S suggested that beyond a 
conservative character, one’s personality also counts:  
I think engineering as a concept is basically the same for 
conservatives and others. It is directly related to education. 
Moreover, as far as I have observed, non-conservative engineers 
have better performance. I do not know the reason. Maybe it is 
because of the social circles in which they are involved, or their 
family, but their perception about engineering is much better than 
that of conservative engineers. I think these abilities and the 
perception of engineering have just been improving recently. On the 
other hand, when it comes to being innovative, we can be innovative 
too. It depends on the character of the person. I believe that I’m an 
innovative person for my organization as well, but people do not 
say, ‘This conservative engineer is innovative.’ Instead they say, 
“This engineer is innovative”. I mean it is beyond these 
classifications (Mr. S, age 31). 
Beyond their professional approach, the distinction between the behavior of 
conservative and non-conservative engineers was described as follows by 
Mrs. M: 
On the difference between the attitudes of conservative engineers 
and non-conservative engineers, I believe that non-conservative 
engineers are more task-oriented while conservative engineers are 
more human-oriented. For example, our previous manager was 
requesting solutions to reduce expenses, such as using scrap paper 
for photocopying, etc., while the company was going through a 
fiscal bottleneck. However, the one who followed him directly fired 
workers to reduce expenses (Mrs M, age 32). 
Similarly, Mr. K said: “I believe that our main characteristics are being 
disciplined, working hard to deserve our salary, and paying extra attention to do 
our jobs right. On the other hand, being conservative is an invisible 
characteristic” (Mr. K, age 30). 
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Within his idealized vision of a conservative character, Mr. O described the 
difference between conservative and non-conservative engineers as minimal due 
to inadequate Islamic education: 
People who have values are supposed to perform their jobs and 
duties with discipline. However I think there is a problem with 
education. Conservative people with religious values and others are 
almost the same. We could not transfer our values to the next 
generations. People might have been protecting their values but there 
is a huge difference between being Muslim and living Islam (Mr. O, 
age 59). 
Based on their answers, my informants’ perception of religion appears to follow a 
modern, secular pattern. On the other hand, in some of the responses, the 
religious values to be protected were emphasized. One of the informants 
described the relation between religious perception and technology as follows: 
We should behave like the whirling dervishes. One of feet must 
stand firm on the ground while our other foot is whirling. As 
Muslims, we should work harder, because working is a kind of 
worship. Working for the benefit of human beings is a practice we 
inherited from our Prophet. Our elders were always giving examples 
of these benefits, such as building mosques and fountains. However, 
developing technology was dismissed. Whereas that is also for the 
benefit of humankind (Mr. S, age 31). 
In this whirling dervish metaphor, the foot standing firmly on the ground 
represents the values and practices of religion, while the whirling foot represents 
enhancing perception. This position resembles the thoughts of Muhammad Abduh 
and Mehmed Akif on reforming religion by considering new thought currents in 
the world while protecting Islamic values. Even though Abduh and Mehmed Akif 
were considered Islamists, the latter was realizing the conservative modernism 
project by suggesting a work ethic for the Islamic world, which he saw as 
hopeless, and by positing a clear separation between cultural values and the 
material needs of a civilization (Bora, 1998, p. 80). 
	  	   89 
4.5 Political Leaders Associated With the Modernization of Turkey 
 
The events and individuals considered milestones in the political history of 
Turkey vary from person to person, depending upon his or her cultural and 
political background. A respond described the approach of conservative engineers 
to this issue as follows: 
For a republican government, the important issue is to ensure the 
participation of all segments of society in the modernization project. 
When we look at the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, it is 
obviously a modernization project maintained by the military. The 
Menderes era was a different breaking point, the Turgut Özal era 
was another one, and Erdoğan as well was a breaking point for 
Turkey. However, in Turkey we couldn’t succeed in having a 
modernization project with the participation of universities, the 
military, the bureaucracy, politicians and society working in concert. 
So I am not able to indicate a milestone for Turkish modernization 
(Mr. J, age 55). 
In the same vein, Mr. Z said: 
I think we could mention four names as milestones of Turkish 
modernization: Mustafa Kemal, Adnan Menderes, Turgut Özal, and 
Tayyip Erdoğan. They have each had a different vision. Even though 
the last three names are recognized as conservative, this 
characteristic did not affect their modern spirits (Mr. Z, age 62). 
Likewise, Mr. F said: “The 1980 military coup, after that the Özal era and his 
liberal economic policies” (Mr. F, age 42). That was the obvious milestone for 
my respondents, with Mrs. M adding: “For me it is the Özal era. Reforms in the 
economic field, the development of the defense industry, foreign policy, and 
economic freedom were all important. After 2001, greater freedom of expression 
was granted and the prejudices circulating in society were broken. Society is open 
to reforms” (Mrs. M, age 32).  
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The only response that differed from the above came from Mrs. C (age 37), who 
stated that Atatürk was the absolute and only milestone in Turkey’s 
modernization process. 
Almost all the informants gave the names of Menderes and Özal as milestones of 
Turkish modernization. These two names are iconic in Turkish politics for 
enacting liberal economic agendas while they were Prime Minister. Furthermore, 
Menderes and Özal both had a conservative profile along with their innovative, 
developmentalist character.  
One of the interesting points about the informants’ responses was their silence 
about Erbakan. None mentioned Erbakan’s name when they talked about the 
modernization process. Even though Erbakan can be qualified more as an Islamist 
than a conservative, he was followed by religious people in Turkish society. More 
than that, he was an engineer-politician who emphasized his training in 
engineering more than any other engineer-politician, using it to legitimate his 
projects for developing Turkey through industrialization. 
This lack of interest in Erbakan on the part of conservative engineers is 
significant. It would appear to suggest that for Turkish conservative engineers, 
modernization is more about liberal economics than about industrialization. They 
desire to be integrated into the modern world market and have technological 
interactions with it. A socio-economic order based upon Islamic principles, such 
as Erbakan’s “The Just Order,” either does not interest these engineers, or they do 
not believe in the sustainability of socio-economic systems outside of the one led 
by the western world.  
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Conclusion 
 
“Modern destiny is spiritual at the beginning, mechanical at the end” wrote 
Ahmet Çiğdem following his readings of Weber (2010, p. 164). As a religious 
person who attended an imam-hatip school and then received an engineering 
education, the foremost question on my mind was “Are we modern?” I directed 
this question to people of a similar background who define themselves as 
religious or conservative, speak European languages and are involved in western 
culture, and, more importantly, had received an education based on European 
curricula.  
Weber used the term “rationality” to define capitalist economic activity, the 
modern system of private law, and bureaucratic authority. Rationalism addresses 
an expansion of social spaces which are submitted to the rational decision-making 
mechanism. The influence of instrumental action on various spaces in life besides 
technological components, such as urbanization, transportation, and 
communication, is known as industrialization.  
The further rationalization of a society requires the institutionalization of 
technological and scientific developments. The influence of technology and 
science over social spaces damages old-fashioned or inherited legitimations. 
Worldviews that shape the actions of people and the profanation of inherited 
cultural values or the “disenchantment of the world” are one of the dimensions of 
rationality on which I have focused in this thesis.  
As in most developing countries, in Turkey too the modernization project was 
largely executed through industrialization. Industrialization was one of Turkish 
politicians’ main agenda items, and it was carried out by engineers in the 
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technical domain but also partly in politics. Engineers were involved in various 
fields during Turkey’s development process. This unique position was explained 
by the majority of my informants as highly qualified members of society carrying 
their engineering identity into various sectors and performing well there. 
However, I take the active roles of engineers in the modernization process with 
preliminary implications. Basically, how do they define themselves as a religious 
person and engineer and how do they position themselves in the society? 
Since my question was directed at conservative engineers, which, in the Turkish 
context, means observant Muslim engineers, I centered my research around the 
notion of religion: religion dealing with the Enlightenment in the West, Muslims 
dealing with Western modernism, the mechanical secularization of the Turkish 
Republic, and, lastly, reactions against this type of secularization from 
conservative engineers. This is a multi-dimensional problem that cannot be 
analyzed solely with consideration of the inner dynamics of conservative 
individuals; rather, it must also take into account their international interactions.  
First, Muslims face many paradoxes in modern Turkey, but most do not react to 
them; with typical conservative behavior, they choose to adapt religion to the new 
order in order to maintain religion’s perpetuity. This adaptation has taken shape 
by preserving values while adapting to the requirements of social and 
professional life. Questions were asked of the informants regarding the 
characteristics of their professional environments. The majority defined their 
environment as non-professional. One of the reasons given was Turkey’s 
instability for forming professionalized fields. Engineers prefer to gain experience 
in different fields, in order to be able to switch fields in case of a decline in 
opportunities in the field in which they work. Note that for Weber, rationalization 
is the formation of areas of expertise. In this case, science does not represent a 
domain of expertise and it is not possible to mention the existence of 
institutionalized scientific discourse. When asked whether they use method or 
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initiative in their professional lives, all said that even if using methodologies is 
less risky, in most cases they felt that they should use initiative because poorly 
defined jobs call for the use of initiative whether they are in a technical or a 
managerial position. In this case, it would not be appropriate to define engineers 
as representatives of a western type of rationalism. 
On the issue of creating a balance between their personal values and beliefs and 
their professional lives, the informants’ responses suggest a secularized life. 
There is a division between their personal and professional lives, each of which 
has its own space. This division of spaces isolates these two spaces’ values and 
standards. Even though Islamic faith requires Muslims to fashion every part of 
their lives according to Islam, these engineers legitimated their positions as 
working in concert with people from different lifestyles and values, noting 
professional life’s philosophy of being beyond personal choices. Failures exist in 
the transfer of values from families to children, hence the similarity between 
engineers from conservative and non-conservative backgrounds. Even in 
examples given to illustrate difference, being human-oriented versus task-
oriented may not reflect religious values. Overall, being conservative remains 
invisible in professional life.  
On the subject of politics, the names associated with the modernization of Turkey 
were the same for almost all informants: the three names given repeatedly were 
Adnan Menderes, Turgut Özal, and Tayyip Erdoğan. The common point of these 
three names is their political and economic inclinations: all followed liberal 
economic policies, supported an open market economy, and had close relations 
with the West, especially with the United States. Even though these men are seen 
by the public as conservative and have lived in accordance with religious norms, 
their politics were not directly aligned with Islamic doctrine.  
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Regarding their decision to become engineers, two reasons were highlighted. 
First, engineers’ interest in economic development rather than industrial 
development must be their priority at the first stage of the state’s development 
(although each may lead the other to develop successively at later stages). 
Second, from the perspective of engineers, modernization meant economic 
development and adaptation to the western financial system. Even though they 
believed in technological development, they did not mention any industrialization 
drive such as the one once attempted by Erbakan. The cause adopted by Erbakan 
had been to establish a socio-economic order based upon Islamic values, one that 
did not violate religious prohibitions (haram) such as the one on interest. He 
named it “The Just Order”. Erbakan also had plans to establish heavy industry in 
Turkey and to develop technologies independently of western technology, 
especially in the defense industry. Even though all the informants believed in the 
need for such industries, none mentioned Erbakan’s name as an important figure 
in Turkey’s modernization. 
I believe this is a process of adaptation to the modern world that legitimates itself 
by separating personal beliefs and values from public life for the sake of 
professionalism. In the end, such adaptation may have occurred for the sake of 
the continuity and development of the country, and of preserving religion by 
protecting it from external interventions such as western rationalism and 
westernization as a state ideology.  
It is hardly possible to claim that these conservative engineers are non-rational, 
ultimately prioritizing economics over technology. They are rational in a sense 
that is not purely based on reason. Contrary to the western type of tight 
bureaucracy that fills all the gaps in professional life with method, they take 
initiative, are concerned with transmitting their inherited values to the next 
generation, and wish to serve their country and perpetuate its state. However, in 
the end, they have chosen a conformist way of life under the prevailing 
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circumstances, instead of directly carrying their values into public life and 
representing their religion as they were commanded to do by the Islamic faith. A 
question remains after this study, pointing toward the future: do these qualities 
resemble the Protestants mentioned by Weber, praising work and occupation for 
the sake of religion (in Weber’s own words, “living acceptably to God”), which 
evolves into a profane form over time? 
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